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A major part of previous studies believed that excessive state interventions that 
impair NGOs’ independency would lead to poor performances.  Few see the positive 
impacts of state interventions on NGO’s performances.  However, in China, 
evidences have shown that the “affinity” to the government in some aspects have 
helped NGOs to display better performances both in achieving their goals and in 
influencing the society. 
Then what are these “affinities”?  How exactly do they affect NGOs’ 
performances and why is so?  
This research, through the cases of Chinese local NGOs, attempts to argue that 
state interventions display in diversified forms and each form has its unique way of 
influence on NGOs’ performances.  By investigating the correlations between each 
form of state interventions and NGOs’ performances one by one, this study attempts 
to discover the mechanisms that work through state-NGO relations on NGO’s 
performances. 
Relying on previous studies, I abstracted five forms of state interventions/NGO 
dependency on the state: funding dependency, organizational dependency, human 
resources dependency, operational dependency and publicity dependency.  Efficacy 
is a term I use to evaluate NGO performance.   I conclude that each form of NGO 
dependency on the state functions in a unique way affecting an NGO’s efficacy.  An 
NGO’s organizational dependency and operational dependency on the government 
 viii
negatively impact its efficacy.  Hence, with all other factors being equal, the more 
dependent an NGO is in organizational framework or operations on the government, 
the poorer its performance.  In contrast, an NGO’s publicity dependency on the 
government increases its efficacy.  The situation for funding and human resources 
dependency is more complicated.  For funding, small-scale NGOs and large-scale 
NGOs show completely different patterns of influences.  A small-scale NGO’s 
funding dependency on the government leads to higher efficacy, compared to no 
government funding at all.  A large-scale NGO’s funding dependency has a negative 
correlation with efficacy, that is, the more financially dependent a large-scale NGO is 
on the government, the lower its efficacy.  For human resources, top-down NGOs 
and bottom-up NGOs have a clear divergence on the question of efficacy.  For a 
top-down NGO, dependency on the government for human resources generally works 
positively for its efficacy.  For a bottom-up NGO, which has comparatively less 
human resources dependency on the government, keeping the status quo while 
expanding the personal network with the government, helps to increase its efficacy. 
A survey, interviews and archival research were conducted.  Both a  quantitative 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The World Bank defines Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) as “private 
organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the 
poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community 
development.”  Generally speaking, the term NGO can be applied to any non-profit 
organization which is independent from a government.  NGOs are typically 
value-based organizations which depend, in whole or in part, on charitable donations 
and voluntary service.1 
Autonomy from the state is one of the most important characteristics of NGOs.  
By and large, it is believed that excessive state interventions that impair NGOs’ 
independency lead to poor performances;2  however, in totalitarian countries this is 
not always the case.  Evidence shows that some NGOs in totalitarian countries are 
even willing to be affiliated with the government for a better performance rather than 
being fully independent.  There are cases in China of grassroots NGOs being 
transformed into state-affiliated ones (so called GONGOs) and displaying better 
performances both in achieving their goals and influencing the society after giving up 
part of their independence to the government.  So, how do state interventions3 affect 
                                                        
1 From the World Bank’s Operational Directive 14.70, see 
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/61ByDocName/ResourcesonSocialAnalysisGlossaryofKeyTerms, 
available on July 6, 2005. 
2 This is commonly believed among both scholars and professionals.  Scholarly representatives on China studies 
are Jonathan Unger, Vivienne Shue, Bruce J. Dickson, Margaret M. Pearson and Mary E. Gallagher. 
3 I assume that what happens in China generally is not state-NGO collaboration but dependency/intervention in 
essence.  If elaborated, the argument will need much more space to prove.   However, the pivotal difference 
between a collaborative relationship and a dependent one is whether equal status between the two sides exists.  
Equal status is essential in a collaborative relationship which is right what is lacking in the state-NGO relationship 
in China. 
 2
an NGO’s performance in China? 
Efficacy, a term I will elaborate on in the literature review, is the term I use to 
evaluate NGO performance.  My research attempts to examine the correlations, if 
any, between an NGO’s efficacy and its dependency on the government in a 
totalitarian state, through the case of China.  Further, I will delve into the deeper side 
of the society and find out the reasons behind the correlations.  I will argue that in 
China, state intervention demonstrates in diversified forms and each form has its 
unique way of influence on NGO efficacy. 
 
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 
Literature 
 As the thesis mainly explores the relationships between two concepts – 
state-NGO relations and NGO’s efficacy – the literature is comprised of two parts 
respectively for each concept. 
 
Theories on state-society relations are an important reference for state-NGO 
relation studies, since NGOs that exist outside the government as a whole is a crucial 
component of the society.  Before the 1970s, “state-society relations” was more a 
casual phrase than a theoretical framework; the dominant theories and research 
agendas were largely society centered4.  The situation changed around the late 1970s.  
                                                        
4 Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In” in Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State 
Back In (1985). 
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One of the pioneering works was Skocpol’s classic study on the role of the state in 
great social revolutions, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of 
France, Russia, and China.  In this book, he treats the state as “an autonomous 
structure – a structure with a logic and interests of its own not necessarily equivalent 
to, or fused with, the interests of the dominant class in society or the full set of 
member groups in the polity.”5  Since then, state-centered research blossomed in 
studies of social movements6 and economic development7.  As the state-society 
theory developed, more and more societal factors were brought back on the stage.  In 
the study of social movement, scholars such as Goldstone and McDaniel emphasize 
not only the structure and nature of state but also factors such as the population 
density, economic structures and ideational factors8.  Obviously, the state-society 
relation perspective is intended to achieve a more balanced understanding of some 
political processes by apprehending not only the structure and nature of the state, but 
also the interactions between the state and the society. 
All in all, state-society relations can be described in terms of cooperation, conflict, 
or a mix of cooperation and conflict.  The dominant themes within state-societal 
literature are the dichotomous relationship of state-society relations 
(engagement-disengagement) and the assumed relationship of conflict between state 
                                                        
5  Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China 
(Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 27. 
6 Works such as John Foran, Theorizing Revolutions (London and New York: Routledge, 1997); Jeff Goodwin and 
Theda skocpol (1989), “Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World,” Politics and Society, Vol. 17, 
No.4, pp. 489-509; Tim McDaniel, Autocracy, Capitalism and Revolution in Russia, (UC Press, 1988), etc. 
7 Works such as Amsden, Alice, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1989); Thomas Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle, (Armonk, New York, 1986); 
Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries, 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), etc. 
8 In their works, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (UC Press, 1991) and Autocracy, 
Modernization, and Revolution in Russia and Iran (Princeton University Press, 1991), respectively. 
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and society.  A continuum of state-society relations that may be generalized across 
all cases of such relations, were proposed by many scholars as well.9 
 
Studies by Gidron, Kramer and Salamon, in which the authors construct a set of 
models out of comparative studies among a wide range of countries on the 
relationship of government and the third sector10, are the major contributions to both 
state-society and state-NGO studies.  The authors stress one important variable in 
explaining how the role of NGOs varies from country to country – the legal system – 
whether it is based on Roman law, which tends to be more government-oriented, or 
common law, which is more market-oriented.  The degree of state centralization or 
decentralization follows a similar pattern.11 
Out of a combination of such variables the authors constructed four models of 
state-NGO relations, ranging from the “government-dominant” to the “third sector12 
dominant,” with “dual” and “collaborative” in between.  The “government 
dominant” model refers to countries in which the government has the absolute power 
while NGOs are only subordinative.  The “third sector dominant” model generalizes 
countries with the opposite situation with the “government dominant” one – their third 
sector dominates in the society instead of the government.  The “dual” model has 
                                                        
9 Works, such as Casper, Gretchen and Michelle M. Taylor, Negotiating Democracy, (University of Pittsburgh 
Press 1996) and Chehabi, HE and Stepan, Alfred, (eds.) Politics, Society, and Democracy: Comparative Studies, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), assume all possible stages of state-society interactions, ranging from extreme 
cooperation to extreme conflict. 
10 This is also the name of the book written by Benjamin Gidron, Ralph M. Kramer and Lester M. Salamon. 
11 Benjamin Gidron, Ralph M. Kramer and Lester M. Salamon: Government and the Third Sector: Emerging 
Relationships in Welfare States (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992), 246 pp. 
12 The third sector, as commonly accepted, refers to the bodies standing between the public and the private sectors 
in a society. 
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both the government and the third sector exist in parallel.  The “collaborative” model 
supposes the two function collaboratively.  However, the “government-dominant” 
ones are becoming less common, with Great Britain, Israel, and France all 
increasingly moving towards “collaborative” approaches.  The authors find that 
governments are trying to “animate” other agents to deliver what are currently still 
government services, be it for economic or political reasons.13 
Another set of literature on state-NGOs relations includes a series of Dennis R. 
Young’s works (199914, 2000).  Building on Gidron, Kramer and Salamon’s four 
models of state-NGOs relations, Young advanced another set of models: the 
supplementary model, complementary model and adversarial model.   
 
Different strands of economic theory support alternative notions of the nonprofit 
sector as supplementary, complementary, or adversarial to government.  In the 
supplementary model, nonprofits are seen as fulfilling the demand for public 
goods left unsatisfied by government…In the complementary view, nonprofits 
are seen as partners to government, helping to carry out the delivery of public 
goods largely financed by government…In the adversarial view, nonprofits prod 
government to make changes in public policy and to maintain accountability to 
the public.15 
 
However, “the three perspectives are by no means mutually exclusive.”16  “A 
historical review of the United States revealed that all three views have validity and 
that government-nonprofit sector relations must be understood as a multilayered 
                                                        
13 Ibid. 
14 Dennis R. Young, “Government and Nonprofit Organizations: the Challenges of Civil Society,” Chapter one in 
Elizabeth T. Boris and C Eugene Steurele (eds.), Complementary, Supplementary or Adversarial? A Theoretical 
and Historical Examination of Nonprofit-Government Relations in the U.S., the Urban Institute, 1999.   
15 Dennis R. Young, “Alternative Models of Government-Nonprofit Relations: Theoretical and International 
Perspectives,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, March 2000, p.151. 
16 Ibid., prelude 
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phenomenon.” 17   Further comparative application of the three models on four 
countries, the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel and Japan, is also provided 
by the author. 
 
China-related literature on state-NGO relations consists of numerous debates. 
One primary debate on Chinese state-society relations centers on the fit of two 
disparate analytical frameworks, civil society and corporatism.  Both of these 
originate from the West, with the former from Marx, Habermas and Thomas Janoski, 
the latter derived from Schmitter18.  In Chinese state-society relations literature, 
noting the emergence and expansion of NGOs in Deng Xiaoping’s China, some China 
specialists, following the civil society approach, argue whether or not the NGOs’ 
development in China could be ascribed to the rise of a civil society.  Corporatists 
doubt about it, arguing that “Such an analytical framework assumes too much 
independence in associational life in China.  State corporatism … provides a more 
accurate description of what has been emerging there.”19 
However, this corporatist view has been implicitly challenged by others, who, 
                                                        
17 Ibid., prelude. 
18 Janoski devised a one sentence core definition of civil society that is often quoted in papers on the topic: “Civil 
society represents a sphere of dynamic and responsive public discourse between the state, the public sphere 
consisting of voluntary organizations, and the market sphere concerning private firms and unions” (Thomas 
Janoski, Citizenship and Civil Society: a framework of rights and obligations in liberal, traditional, and social 
democratic regimes, (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 12.)  Similarly, Schmitter’s definition of 
corporatism is also broadly quoted, “Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically 
ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a 
deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls 
on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports” (Schmitter, “Still the Century of 
Corporatism?” in Fredrick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch (eds.), The New Corporatism: Social-Political Structures in 
the Iberian World (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), pp. 93-94.) 
19 Jonathan Unger, Anita Chan, “China, Corporatism and the East Asian Model,” The Australian Journal of 
Chinese Affairs, No. 33 (Jan., 1995), p.39. 
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while recognizing some characteristics of state corporatism in Chinese NGOs, point to 
a more complex set of state-NGO relations.  Vivienne Shue suggested “a possible 
continuum of associational structures and experiences stretching from those 
relatively…state-dominated at one extreme, to those relatively…autonomous, at the 
other.”20   Jonathan Unger’s study of business associations concludes that a complex 
set of factors has affected the status, autonomy, and activities of Chinese NGOs.  
While some Chinese business associations have been completely dominated by state 
agencies, others have shown a surprising level of independence and a capacity to 
represent the interests of their members.  Margaret Pearson’s work on foreign and 
Chinese business associations provides similar evidence. 
 
Besides the above works on the degrees of state interventions/NGO’s dependency, 
several additional works discussed the forms of state intervention/NGO’s 
dependency on the state in China.  Mary Gallagher in her passage “China: The 
Limits of Civil Society in a Late Leninist State”21 talked about four forms of state 
interventions – financial subsidizing, legitimacy authorizing, double posting of 
personnel and ideology and interest representation.  On NGO’s financial autonomy, 
she pointed out “top-down social organizations receive some financial subsidization 
from the government, whereas bottom-up groups are expected to raise funds from 
                                                        
20 Vivienne Shue, “State power and social organization in China,” in Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, Vivienne Shue 
(eds.), State Power and Social Forces : Domination and Transformation in the Third World, (New York : 
Cambridge University Press , 1994), pp. 77-84. 
21 Mary E. Gallagher, “China: The Limits of Civil Society in a Late Leninist State,” in Muthiah Alagappa ed., 
Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space, (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 419-454. 
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society.”22  As for legitimacy:  
 
Social organizations suffer from a “paradox of legitimacy.”  They must get 
legitimacy from a branch of the Communist Party or government body and get 
legal authorization from the state.  At the same time, they must find legitimacy 
within market society.23 
 
Double-posting of personnel refers to “appointing government or party cadres to 
serve jointly as officials of the social organization.”24  “This interpenetration occurs 
at all levels of social organization.”25  Last but not least:  
A final constraint to the development of Chinese social organizations is the 
ideology of the CCP26 – in particular its ongoing commitment to serve as the 
encompassing group for all legitimate societal interests.27 
 
In Zhang Ye’s work28, the constraints brought upon the NGOs by the “dual 
management system” (which will be explained in detail in Chapter two) of the 
government, are discussed.  One of the constraints derives from state interventions 
into NGO’s day-to-day operations. 
The sponsoring agency is responsible for supervising the NGO’s day-to-day 
activities and for annually reviewing the work of its affiliated NGOs.  This 
requirement encouraged the registration of NGOs to be closely linked with the 
government.  In this way, the Tiananmen incident of 1989 was a setback to NGO 
development.  Furthermore, the cultural salons, press and journals that 
advocated democracy and political reform were banned by the government.29 
 
Another analytical framework proposed by Shen Yuan and Sun Wusan, the five 
                                                        
22 Ibid., p. 426. 
23 Ibid., pp. 426-427. 
24 Ibid., p. 427. 
25 Ibid., p. 427. 
26 CCP: China Communist Party. 
27 Mary E. Gallagher, “China: The Limits of Civil Society in a Late Leninist State,” in Muthiah Alagappa ed., 
Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space, (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 428. 
28 Zhang Ye, “China’s Emerging Civil Society,” CNAPS Working Paper, August 2003, the Brookings Institution, 
see http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/ye2003.htm, available on July 7, 2005. 
29 Ibid., p. 10. 
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forms of NGO dependency on the government, has surfaced in the literature as a way 
to understand the diversified ways of state interventions on NGOs.  Operational 
network dependency, as the literal name shows, is a type of NGO dependency on 
government networks for the NGO’s day-to-day operations.  Institutional 
dependency refers to NGOs under state supervision due to active regulations.  
Organizational dependency and funding dependency resemble Gallagher’s legitimacy 
authorizing and financial subsidizing respectively.  Social recognition dependency 
refers to an NGO’s dependency on state-owned media for public recognition and 
reputation.30 
 
As for NGO’s efficacy, the evaluation of NGO’s performance, the 3Es theory 
from economics, is most frequently employed.  The 3Es are Economy, Efficiency and 
Effectiveness.  Economy refers to the input of an organization or a project.  
Efficiency relates to the quantity of the output.  Effectiveness is the quality of the 
out-put.  So, comparing organizations’ efficacies would be comparing their outputs 
both quantitatively and qualitatively, keeping the amount of the inputs constant. 
In most recent studies of non-profit organization evaluations, the quantitative 
outputs are referred to as the “outputs,” the qualitative outputs are the “outcomes.”  
The “outputs” are the units of service regarding the program, for example, the number 
of people taught, counseled, sheltered, fed, clothed, etc.  These “outputs” indicates 
                                                        
30 Shen Yuan, Sun Wusan, “Institutions’ Different Contents with the Same Appearance and Social Organizations’ 
Development, (zhidu de xingtongyizhi yu shehui tuanti fayu,” in China Youth Development Foundation ed., 
China’s Social Organizations at the Crossing (chuyu shizi lukou de zhongguo shetuan), (Tianjin, Tianjin People’s 
Press). also see at http://www.cydf.org.cn/gb/conference/speech/paper-c/17.htm, accessed on February 7, 2005. 
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the scale of the activities but in no way do they indicate about the actual 
impacts/benefits/changes in the clients who went through the program.  The 
“outcomes” are the actual impacts/benefits/changes for participants during or after the 
program.   
For example, for a smoking cessation program, an outcome might be 
“participants quit smoking.”  These changes, or outcomes, are usually expressed 
in terms of: 
Knowledge and skills (these are often considered to be rather short-term 
outcomes); 
Behaviors (these are often considered to be rather intermediate-term outcomes); 
Values, conditions and status (these are often considered to be rather long-term 
outcomes)31 
 
Furthermore, Deng Guosheng’s Public Benefit Project Evaluation 32  studies 
specified standards for evaluating Chinese NGOs.  He proposed an APC model, 
which combines Accountability, Performance and Capacity factors for evaluating an 
NGO.  Accountability refers to an NGO’s contribution to the society.  Performance 
approximates the 3Es.  Capacity involves both of an organization’s tangible capacity, 
i.e. human resources, offices, funds, etc. and intangible capacity, i.e. organizational 
framework, operational system, communication system, etc. 
 
Review of Literature 
In totalitarian countries, the legal system does not determine the degree of state 
centralization; rather it is the totalitarian essence of the state that determines the fact 
of state centralization. Gidron, Kramer and Salamon’s argument that 
                                                        
31 http://www.managementhelp.org/evaluatn/outcomes.htm#anchor30249, available on January 15, 2006. 
32 Deng Guosheng, “Gongyi Zuzhi Pinggu,” (Public Benefit Project Evaluation), China: Social Sciences 
Academic Press, 2003. 
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“government-dominant” countries are forming increased collaborations with NGOs 
could also be applied to China.  Young’s three models also suggest possible 
alternative state-NGO relation types besides totally adversarial ones.  Gidron, 
Kramer, Salamon and Young’s findings constitute the theoretical base of this thesis. 
For China-related literature, Shue, Unger and Pearson’s argument about the 
degrees of NGO’s dependency/state interventions structures the basic assumption of 
this thesis.  I assume that Chinese NGOs bear different degrees of dependency on the 
state, including complete independency.  In other words, Chinese NGOs are spread 
out along the state dependency continuum.  If 0 is complete independency and 1 is 
complete dependency, then the range of an NGO’s dependency is X and 0≤X＜1.  
Therefore, GONGOs are treated as NGOs as well in this thesis so long as they do not 
depend 100% on the state. 
The major underlying assumption of both civil society and corporatist application 
on China’s case is that the rise of NGOs recede state power and state interventions 
constrain NGO development.  Few see the positive impacts of state intervention on 
NGO performance.  Gallagher mentioned in her passage “China: The Limits of Civil 
Society in a Late Leninist State,” that “Party-state penetration of social organizations 
through double-posting of personnel is not uniformly recognized as bad for the 
growth of social associations.”  However, she did not follow up with this argument.  
This thesis can be seen as illustrating the positive impacts of state intervention on 
NGO performance. 
Gallagher, Zhang Ye, and especially Shen Yuan and Sun Wusan’s discussions on 
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the forms of state intervention/NGO dependency are the most applicable to this thesis.  
From these discussions, five forms of state intervention/NGO dependency can be 
abstracted and reinforced to constitute the major part of the theoretical framework of 
this thesis.  The correlation between state intervention and NGO efficacy will then 
be examined separately between each form of state intervention and NGO efficacy. 
While NGO performance is of ultimate concern to many of the Chinese NGO 
studies, most only have ambiguous standards for evaluating NGO performance.  
However, it is difficult to identify factors impacting NGO performance when the 
performance itself is not actually reviewed.  Thus, a measurement of NGO 
performance will comprise the other half of the theoretical framework of this thesis.  
Deng Guosheng’s model certainly displays a more detailed and comprehensive 
measurement, but due to its all-inclusiveness it is not as applicable as the 3Es as well 
as the non-profit organization evaluation theories.  The APC model fits single case 
studies, but makes it too hard to make comparative studies, for researchers must 
ensure each single criterion suits all cases for comparison.  Therefore, the 3Es as 
well as the non-profit organization evaluation theories will be primarily applied to 
measure NGO performance. 
 
Theoretical framework 
I argue that state interventions primarily take five forms in China: interventions 
through funding, organizational frameworks, operations, human resources and 
publicity, and each form has its unique way of influence on NGO efficacy.  An 
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NGO’s organizational dependency and operational dependency on the government 
negatively impact its efficacy.  Hence, with all other factors being equal, the more 
dependent an NGO is in organizational framework or operations on the government, 
the poorer its performance.  In contrast, an NGO’s publicity dependency on the 
government increases its efficacy.  The situation for funding and human resources 
dependency is more complicated.  For funding, small-scale NGOs and large-scale 
NGOs show completely different patterns of influences.  A small-scale NGO’s 
funding dependency on the government leads to higher efficacy, compared to no 
government funding at all.  A large-scale NGO’s funding dependency has a negative 
correlation with efficacy, that is, the more financially dependent a large-scale NGO is 
on the government, the lower its efficacy.  For human resources, top-down NGOs 
and bottom-up NGOs have a clear divergence on the question of efficacy.  For a 
top-down NGO, dependency on the government for human resources generally works 
positively for its efficacy.  For a bottom-up NGO, which has comparatively less 
human resources dependency on the government, keeping the status quo while 
expanding the personal network with the government, helps to increase its efficacy. 
The five forms of dependency of NGOs on the government are defined/measured 
as below. 
1) Funding Dependency: what percentage of government funding provides an 
NGO’s overall revenue 
2) Organizational Dependency: whether or not an NGO has to respond to one 
or more government superintendent units; whether or not an NGO copies the 
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government’s organizational framework set-up; whether and to what degree 
an NGO enjoys independency in its constitution-making. 
3) Human Resources Dependency: how broad and deep is an NGO’s personal 
network with the government; whether and to what degree the government 
interferes in an NGO’s personnel recruitment; whether an NGO’s personnel 
welfare is included in the government budget. 
4) Operational Dependency: to what degree the government interferes in an 
NGO’s internal decision-making and daily activities-conducting; to what 
degree an NGO’s operation is dependent on government networks. 
5) Publicity Dependency: to what degree an NGO is dependent on the 
government for government-controlled media to win public recognition and 
reputation. 
For measuring NGO performance, I introduce the concept of “efficacy.”  
According to the 3Es, efficacy covers both the “efficiency” (the quantity of the output 
compared to the quantity of the input) and the “effectiveness” (the quality of the 
output) of an NGO’s performance.  By synthetically evaluating to what degree an 
NGO’s goals are achieved (the efficiency) and its influence towards the public, the 
state and other players in a society (the effectiveness), I measure an NGO’s efficacy. 
By examining the above five areas of state- NGO relations on the continuum of 
NGO dependency and their respective efficacies, this research seeks to discover how 





I conducted preliminary research from March to June 2004, specifically drafting a 
survey questionnaire33 and refining interview questions34.  I conducted fieldwork for 
more than three months in China, from August to November 2004.  Fieldwork 
activities included a survey, interviews and archival research. 
Survey 
I directed my survey at all local environmental NGOs in Beijing and Shanghai. 
Because of political constraints, it was impossible to select the sample by a systematic 
sampling method.  Instead, I employed the snowball sampling method which 
resembles a random case selection process.  In this snowball method, sampling is 
reliant on referrals from initial subjects to generate additional subjects.  For instance, 
I got two targeted subjects referred by the previous subject I surveyed.   I went on 
for the two targeted subjects and more new subjects were referred.  In this way, the 
snowball went on rolling until I exhausted all observations possible35.  The referring 
by different individuals assures perfect randomness of the sampling.  I directed my 
survey at NGOs, not individuals, so each questionnaire was filled out by an NGO 
associate representing the NGO, or an individual with in-depth knowledge about the 
organization.  Acknowledging people’s unwillingness to take much time on these 
questionnaires, some even scrambles on it, I did the survey by going out visiting each 
                                                        
33 Please see Appendix for the survey questionnaire. 
34 Digital records of the whole interviews are available as well.  Interested parties please contact the author 
directly. 
35 It means that among the 50 NGOs, I visited all that I was able to get in touch with and that managed to have 
someone to fill in the questionnaire for my research. 
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NGO’s office instead of mailing the questionnaires and waiting for the responses.  I 
asked the questions to them and took down the answers or at least sit aside watching 
them filling in the questionnaires to make sure each question is correctly understood 
and seriously answered.  The number of all observations in the chosen field36 is 
around 50 and my sample size is 20, covering 40% of the whole observation group.  
The limited sample size does not suffice a systematic large-N quantitative study, but 
because of its high representability (20 out of 50) it still suits a basic data analysis. 
To control on NGO category and location, the category of environmental NGOs 
and location of metropolitan areas of China (Beijing and Shanghai) are chosen.  I 
chose environmental NGOs because environment protection is a less politically 
sensitive issue in China.  The country’s deteriorating environment urged the 
government to stand on the same side with environmental NGOs.  Therefore, the 
government generally takes encouraging attitudes towards environmental NGOs’ 
development, which contributes to the large number of environmental NGOs 
available for this study.  Two other variables that need to be controlled, NGO’s 
yearly expenditure scale and geographic functional scope, will be illustrated in 
chapter three. 
Interviews 
Since I paid visits to the NGOs’ offices for doing the survey, after I asked the 
survey questions I went on to ask my interview questions.  Besides the 20 NGO 
leaders and associates, I also interviewed several officials from the State Environment 
                                                        
36 Environmental NGOs located in Beijing and Shanghai.  This will be elaborated later. 
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protection Administration and the Ministry of Civil Affairs.  Aside from the initial 
interviews, which often lasted over two hours, I shadowed the interviewee to better 
understand his/her actual work routine and participated in some of each organization’s 
events. 
Archival Research 
I obtained documents from the libraries of the National University of Singapore, 
National Library of China, and Peking University Library, as well as archives from 
Tsinghua NGO Research Center and a few other small underground, but critical, NGO 
newsletter editorial offices.  A considerable amount of other information was 




This research is only a preliminary step in investigating the influence of state 
interventions on NGO efficacy in China.  As such, there are limitations that need to 
be acknowledged and addressed. 
 The key methodological limitation of the present study is the small sample size.  
Due to the political situation as well as limited personnel and other resources, a large 
sample with random selection, which would permit extrapolation in a systematic 
quantitative analysis, was not possible.  Probing their way ahead, especially after the 
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FaLun Gong event37, Chinese NGOs are taking more cautious steps.  This made it 
especially hard to access individuals at NGOs, let alone NGO internal and 
confidential files.  In this way, the data collection of this research is bounded by 
reality constraints.  However, the limitations of the small sample size are lessened by 
the high representability of the sample.  The 20 samples out of the 50 observations 
cover a wide range of NGOs in China, with various takes in each type of government 
dependency, which allows and justifies a basic quantitative introduction of relative 
factors in Chapter three and systematic case studies in Chapter four. 
 Another issue that should be taken into account is the limited means to evaluate 
the dependent variable, NGO efficacy.  The most objective evaluation is a survey of 
public views, but due to time constraints, I was unable to complete such a study. 
 Given these restrictions, I can only make limited generalizations from this study.  
The findings are only suggestive of the possible trend of influence of state 
interventions on NGO efficacy.  More detailed empirical investigation is required to 
provide a more accurate picture of the state of affairs in China.  At the very least, the 
findings of this study can be used to design further relational and organizational 
combined research on Chinese NGOs. 
                                                        
37 FaLun Gong staged a large demonstration in 1999 and was banned and repressed by the Chinese government.  
The Chinese government has branded FaLun Gong as an evil, dangerous cult.  But many people outside consider 
the repression to be a serious violation of freedom of speech, assembly, and religion.  FaLun Gong has a 
following mainly among the elderly and sick, but it has also reached into the middle and lower reaches of the 
Communist Party.  Those detained at Tianjin had staged a one week sit-down protest outside a college which 
sponsors a magazine that had attacked the cult.  Several protests were also held along two sides of the 
Zhongnanhai walled compound, the seat of power of the Chinese Communist Party where Premier Zhu and other 
leaders work. 
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Overview of Chapters 
 
 This study consists of five chapters.  The pivotal analysis of this thesis lies in 
chapter four, which examines the correlations between state interventions and NGO 
efficacy.  Chapter two and three all prepares for Chapter four. 
 Chapter two presents the background of Chinese NGOs, by introducing the 
current Chinese government policies regulating NGOs, the different NGO types 
existing in China, and the different ways in which each NGO type interacts with the 
government. 
 Chapter three draws upon the data analysis of the survey, introduces all factors 
that matter in the main arguments of the thesis, and explains why and how these 
factors matter in their own ways, in preparation for the next chapter which makes uses 
of all these factors as measures for different variables. 
 Chapter four analyzes how state interventions affect NGO efficacy in China, 
making use of all the quantitative and qualitative measures introduced in Chapter 
three.  By conducting both regressions and case studies in this chapter, I will test the 
main hypothesis and prove the thesis arguments.  Further, this chapter seeks to 
answer the question of why state intervention influences NGO efficacy the way it 
does in China.  By doing so, the study tries to discover and explain the mechanisms 
that work through state interventions on NGO efficacy. 
Chapter five concludes with a summary and several possible implications of the 
study and suggestions for future studies. 
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Chapter Two: State-NGO Background 
 
The social-science paradigms that China scholars employed in former decades do 
not adequately fit China as of the 1990s.  Western scholars today find 
themselves struggling to re-conceptualize the workings of a Party-state that no 
longer directly dominates society and of an economy that no longer can be 
classified as “Leninist command.”38 
 
Owing to the Reform and Open policy in China, the plan-based economy is 
changing into a market-based economy.  This not only broke the monopolization of 
the government in the economy field, but also created public space for other social 
forces in the area of social affairs.  The withdrawal of the government from its 
monopolist influence in every field around the country served as the important system 
base on which NGOs could form and grow.  Some former government branches 
separated from the government and became NGOs closely-related with the 
government (GONGOs).  In addition, real grassroots NGOs emerged. 
In particular, NGOs in the field of environment protection grew fastest among 
Chinese NGOs because of their political insensitiveness.  The Chinese leadership is 
aware that the government cannot solve the country’s serious environmental problems 
alone, which explains why since the mid-1990s political space has opened up for 
citizens to create and register organizations to help the government deal with 
environment degradation.  This change reflects the government policy “small 
government, big society.”  Pan Yue, the deputy director of the State Environment 
protection Administration, realizes the significance of public participation in 
                                                        
38 Jonathan Unger, Anita Chan, “China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model,” The Australian Journal of 
Chinese Affairs, No.33 (Jan., 2995), p.25. 
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environment protection and outlines the means to promote public participation in 
environment protection.  He conveys that one of the means is to “strengthen our 
(their) cooperation with non-governmental environmental organizations.”39 
  
The various non-governmental environment organizations, except for some very 
small number of those who abruptly take the western extreme environment 
protection methods without considering the special characteristics of China, the 
majority of them are positive and healthy, especially the youth environment 
volunteers.”  “The government should give active support and direction to these 
organizations.40 
 
Today, approximately fifty citizen environmental groups are registered with the 
government, but since the registration process can take years, hundreds, if not 
thousands, of other environmental activists are doing their work as nonprofit 
corporations or within professional associations, internet-based groups, or very small 
informal volunteer organizations or clubs, e.g., bird watching clubs and student 
organizations. 
This chapter discusses the current government policies regulating NGOs, the 
different NGO types, and how each type interacts with the government. 
 
Government Policies Regulating NGOs 
 
The legislation framework, which forms the “dual management system,” and two 
fundamental principles that govern Chinese NGOs, will be introduced in this section. 
                                                        
39 Pan Yue, Environment Protection and Public Participation, (China: State Environment protection 
Administration, 2004), p.12. 
40 Ibid. 
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Since the legislation framework formed in the 1950s was outdated, the 
“Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Social Organizations” 
(RRASO) was legislated in October 1989.  RRASO is the second law document on 
NGOs since the founding the People’s Republic of China in 1949.  In addition, the 
“Management Measures on Foundations” and the “Interim Procedures on Foreign 
Chambers of Commerce” were formulated in August 1988 and June 1989 respectively.  
In October 1998, the “Interim Procedures on the Registration and Administration of 
Private Non-profit Organizations” was promulgated while the RRASO was revised.  
In August 1999, the “Law of Donation on Public Welfare” was issued.  By 
constructing a legal system through the adoption and implementation of a series of 
laws and regulations, the macro-level management system of the China’s NGOs 
gradually took shape. 
 “One system and two principles” characterize the legal framework governing 
Chinese NGOs.  One system refers to the dual management system, while the two 
principles are the level-based principle and the non-competition principle. 
 
The Dual Management System 
 The dual management system took effect in the 1950s, was reaffirmed by the 
RRASO in 1989 and further adopted by the revised version of RRASO in 1998.  The 
dual management system refers to the two departments responsible for NGO 
registration, administration and routine activities supervision.  One is called the 
Registration Management Agency and the other is a state or Party sponsor, called the 
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Professional Leading Unit (Yewu Zhuguan Danwei).”41 
 The revised version of RRASO stipulates that the Ministry of Civil Affairs and 
the local Civil Affairs Departments (at the county level and above) have the authority 
to register NGOs.  The Registration Management Agencies are held responsible for 
NGO registration, modification and cancellation, as well as annual examination.42 
 NGOs are required to find an organizational sponsor, which is usually a 
government agency carrying out work in a similar subject area, for registration.  An 
environmental NGO, for example, might seek sponsorship from the State 
Environmental Protection Administration or a local Environmental Protection Bureau.  
In the language of the law, this organizational sponsor is called the Professional 
Leading Unit.  According to the new RRASO, the related departments of the State 
Council, the institutions authorized by the State Council43, and the local government 
from above the county level can act as the Professional Leading Units.  Professional 
Leading Units assume responsibility for the examination for NGO registration, 
modification and cancellation. They oversee NGOs to insure that they act in 
accordance with the state’s constitution, laws and regulations and work with the 
Registration Management Agency in other related affairs.44 
 The dual management system is a byproduct of the planned economic system.  
On the one hand, it strengthens the government control over registered NGOs, thereby 
                                                        
41 which was called “guakao danwei” in the old regulation. 
42 Translated from the “Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Social Organizations – State 
Council NO.250 Regulation,” (China: State Council, October 25, 1998).  See 
http://www.mca.gov.cn/artical/content/PMJN/2003122285837.htm (accessed February 4, 2005). 
43 Stipulated in the regulations, those authorized as professional leading units include the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, All-China Women’s Federation, Federation of the Disabled, Federation of Culture and Education, 
the Writers’ Union, etc., altogether 20 organizations. 
44 “RRASO,” (China: State Council, October 25, 1998). 
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weakening NGO independence.  On the other hand, it baffles grassroots NGO 
registration and leaves many in an “existing without a legal status” quandary, as the 
system makes it difficult to access the government Registration Management Agency 
and find a Professional Leading Unit willing to register the NGO. 
 
The Level-based Principle and the Non-Competition Principle 
 Under the dual management system, two fundamental principles dominate the 
laws and regulations concerning NGOs.  One is the registration and management of 
different-scale NGOs by their according bodies under the Ministry of Civil Affairs.  
It is stipulated that national NGOs, as well as trans-province, trans-autonomous region, 
and trans-municipality NGOs, should register at the Ministry of Civil Affairs, while 
local NGOs should register at the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ local departments.45  The 
other principle -- the non-competition principle -- prescribes that NGOs with similar 
scopes of business cannot coexist within the same administration region. 
Again, these two principles feature the hierarchical management and the 
monopolization protection from the planned economy.  The non-competition 
principle protects state-affiliated NGOs to some degree, but also corrupts them from 
the over-protection.  It also hinders the development of real grassroots NGOs by 
imposing another restriction on their registration. 
 
NGO Classification 




 Classifying from origins, there are primarily “two kinds of NGOs that should be 
distinguished from each other, the top-downs and bottom-ups.”46  Top-down NGOs 
refer to those initiated by, or derived from, the government.  Most of them enjoy 
regular resource support from the government.  Generally, they depend more heavily 
on the government.  Bottom-up NGOs apply to real grassroots NGOs.  Usually 
funded by international organizations, they possess a broader reach among the public 
and are more independent from the government. 
However, after the political change mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the 
borderline dividing the two NGO types became blurred.  As the Chinese society 
becomes increasingly pluralized, the government gradually loses control of their 
outreach -- top-down NGOs.  A substantial reflection of this trend is the reduction of 
government funding for NGOs.  Government red-tape stipulated “the three-self 
guideline,” which mandates that NGOs founded after 1985 should seek funding, 
employ personnel, and design activities all by themselves.47  As a result, most 
top-down NGOs are becoming more independent than ever, with only a few 
exceptions48.  Meanwhile, some bottom-up NGOs, seeking greater social influence, 
compromised some of their independence for a closer relationship with the 
government.  For example, the China Environmental Culture Promotion Association 
(CECPA), once supervised by the China Environment Daily, changed course to be 
                                                        
46 Ibid., p.211. 
47 Zhao Xiumei, “The Investigation on Environmental NGOs in Beijing,” in Wang Ming ed. Case Study on 
China’s NGOs, UNCRD Research Report Series No. 38, (China: Tsinghua University NGO Research Center, 2000), 
p.44. 
48 Those few of close interest of the state that the government feels a need to control, e.g. The China Youth 
Development Foundation (CYDF). 
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attached with the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) in 2003, and 
the deputy director of SEPA posts as the chairman of CECPA.49 
 Classified by the registration types, there are primarily four different NGO groups: 
those registered formally under the Ministry of Civil Affairs as NGOs, those 
registered under the Ministry of Industry and Commerce as corporations (taxed 
NGOs), those registered under universities as student organizations, and those that are 
completely non-registered (underground NGOs).  Because of the difficulties of 
formal registration brought about by the legislation framework in China, most 
formally registered NGOs either belong to typical top-down NGOs that benefit from 
their direct connections with the government, or as grassroots NGOs that have strived 
for years to stand out for their performances and build up a personal network with the 
government so as to obtain a legal status. 
 
NGO’s Interaction with the Government 
 
The following five forms of NGO dependency exhaust all possible current means 
of state-NGO interactions in China. 
 
Funding Dependency 
Funding includes both the startup capital required to fund an NGO and the 
operations expenditure required for continued work.  Funding can be provided both 
                                                        
49  Announcement on the Management Adjustment of CECPA, (China: State Environmental Protection 
Administration, 2003), p.1. 
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in forms of money and products, i.e. office space.  Government funding for NGOs 
can take both areas and forms. 
Funding is the most difficult problem facing Chinese NGO development, and is 
also a crucial measure the state takes to penetrate and control NGOs.  Most 
top-down NGOs depend on government-appropriated funds.  Although most 
appropriations are decreasing, since their startup funds came from the government 
finance, top-down NGOs cannot avoid some degree of government control because of 
this “intimate” connection with the government.  Most bottom-up NGOs receive no 
government funding at all, even if some do have the opportunity because of their 
noticeable performances and social influences, and are suffering from a lack of funds.  
Sheri Liao, the director of the Global Village of Beijing (a famous taxed-NGO), 
revealed: 
 
Because of the deficient NGO registration and taxation system [in China], it is 
extremely difficult for environmental grassroots NGOs to seek fund from the 
public.  The Global Village of Beijing never has a fixed funding resource.  Its 
basic expenses reply on the mere income from TV program-making.  Constant 
worrying about funds is their situation.  
 
 Table 2.1, from the Tsinghua University NGO Research Center (NGORC)’s 
survey reflects the funding structure of Chinese NGOs in 1998.  Percentages show 
the average level of nationwide NGOs’ takes from each type of funding resource.  
We can see the “government subsidy” takes up as much as nearly 50%, while the 
other resources, with the exception of “membership fee,” are all below 10%.  This 
reflects the disproportionate funding structure of Chinese NGOs. From the small 
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percentage the “project funds from government” contributes, we can infer that the 
government predominantly sponsors NGOs by way of subsidizing rather than 
financing specific projects.  Subsidizing differs from financing specific projects 
enormously because it erodes NGOs’ organizational independence directly. 
 
Funding Resources Percentage (%) Rank 
Membership Fee 21.18 2 
Activity Profit 6.00 3 
Government Subsidy 49.97 1 







Enterprises Sponsorship 5.63 4 
Domestic Foundations 0.50 12 
Whip-round 2.18 7 
Capital Operation Profit 1.21 11 
Individual Sponsors 1.98 8 
Loan 0.28 13 
Surplus from Previous 
Year 
1.83 9 
Other 4.14 5 
Table 2.1: Chinese NGOs’ Funding Structure in 199850 
 
Organizational Dependency 
Organizational dependency originates from state control of NGOs through the 
                                                        
50 Deng Shengguo, “Report on the Survey on NGOs in China,” Case Study on China’s NGOs 2001, UNCRD 
Research Report Series No. 43, (China: Tsinghua University NGO Research Center, 2001), p.19. 
Tsinghua University NGO Research Center (NGORC) made two surveys on NGOs in 1998 and 2000 each, one 
within Beijing municipality and the other nationwide.  The 2000-year nationwide NGOs survey selects its 
observations from China’s Social Organizations Encyclopedia (China: Patent Literature Press, 1998), China’s 
Social Organizations (database CDROM, China: Publishing House of Electronics Industry, 1999), and a few other 
NGO namelists kept by the NGORC, in total 50,000.  Samples are randomly selected and sample size is 10,000.  
10,000 copies of questionnaires were sent out and 1,564 copies were returned, with a returning rate 15.64%.  
Among the returning copies, 1,508 are valid, with the validity rate 96.4%. 
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Registration Management Agencies and Professional Leading Units.  It will be 
measured by whether or not an NGO has to respond to one or more government 
superintendent units; whether or not an NGO copies the government’s organizational 
framework set-up; whether and to what degree an NGO enjoys independency in its 
constitution-making. 
Among the 1508 NGOs surveyed by the NGORC in 2000, 68.2% of them were 
registered at the Ministry of Civil Affairs or local Civil Affairs Departments as 
generally defined NGOs.  Due to the dual management system, formally registered 
NGOs usually have at least two government supervision units.  Many NGOs have a 
third supervision unit from the government and some have four or more. 
At times, the attitude of the Registration Management Agency will go beyond 
mere “supervision” and become one of asserting political control.  In particular, the 
article of RRASO which gives the Registration Management Agency the authority to 
cancel an NGO’s registration if it “diverts from its original objectives,” can be used to 
exert pressure on organizations that engage in activities government officials find 
objectionable or inconvenient.  Chinese NGO representatives 51  admit that this 
provision limits their activities, often forcing them to tiptoe carefully around issues of 
potential political sensitivity and avoid criticizing the government. 
 Each year, NGOs face two types of examinations -- one for each government 
superintendent unit.  First, by March of each year, each NGO must submit an annual 
report to the Professional Leading Unit detailing its activities over the previous year.  
                                                        
51 At least 3 NGO activists interviewed expressed this concern. 
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In addition, by May of each year, NGOs must undergo an annual investigation by 
their Registration Management Agency.  The examination is one form of state 
intervention derived from the organizational subordinative relations between the 
government and NGOs.  
Besides the institutional control from government supervision units, NGO 
dependency on the state can be demonstrated by the way in which NGOs copy the 
government organizational framework in varying degrees.  “Organizational 
framework” pertains to how an organization divides itself into different sections and 
how each section functions and cooperates with the others, as well as how institutions 
within the organization approach decision-making, leadership formation, etc.  This 
conscious, or unconscious, copying derives from some NGOs’ special connection 
with the government in the past.  Some top-down NGOs were born as ramifications 
of government departments, even if they detached from the government later, so their 
organizational framework naturally follows their “parent.”  Some other NGOs 
employ retired government officials and this personnel arrangement results in further 
organizational framework changes.  Moreover, the state sometimes interferes in the 
NGO constitution-making process and imposes permanent affiliations through written 
clauses, such as “to obey the state” convictions or “to serve the state” obligations, in 
their constitutions. 
 
Human Resources Dependency 
The government might keep NGOs under its control through three means related 
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to human resources.  Each organization’s head, or cadres, network personally with 
the government through working with the government either in the past or 
concurrently.  The government might interfere with an NGO’s recruitment of a new 
head or new cadres.  Moreover, some NGOs’ personnel’s welfare and compensation 
might be included in the government’s budget.   
Among the 1508 NGOs surveyed by NGORC in 2000, 38.5% have their cadres 
assigned or designated by the Professional Leading Units.  23.2% organizations’ 
principals have the nomination right, but then still the nominations have to be ratified 
by the Professional Leading Units.  Only 28.4% NGOs elect their cadres 
democratically according to their constitutions.  The remaining 8.6% have no 
specific rules.52  These data show that NGOs still enjoy limited rights in choosing 
their own leaders. 
As to the background of NGOs’ principals, the NGORC survey showed that 
49.2% organizations’ principals used to hold posts in the government before he/she 
come to the organization.  27.9% used to hold posts at enterprises, 8% at other 
NGOs, 11.5% elsewhere and 3.4% did not answer the question.53  These data again 




 Operational dependency refers to the degree of dependency an NGO has on its 
                                                        
52 Deng Shengguo, “Report on the Survey on NGOs in China,” Case Study on China’s NGOs 2001, UNCRD 
Research Report Series No. 43, (China: Tsinghua University NGO Research Center, 2001), p.14. 
53 Ibid., p.21. 
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internal decision-making, daily operations and conducting activities, as well as its 
operational network dependency on the state.  During interviews conducted for this 
study, both NGO and government representatives were asked whether or not the 
government constrains or pressures NGOs on their internal decision-making, daily 
operations and conducting activities, what kind of constraints or pressures are given, 
and how much they impact an NGO’s operational processes.  Chapter four will 
examine these interview records in depth. 
 NGO operational network dependency on the state illustrates the scope with 
which NGOs depend on professional networking with the government or on 
government networks to manage operations and to develop projects.  Take the 
“Project Hope” by the China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF) for instance, 
this charitable project, through mobilizing both internal and overseas resources, has 
built over 7,000 “hope primary schools” and has allowed millions of children living in 
poverty-stricken areas to attend school.  This powerful social mobilization results 
from CYDF’s vast and pervasive nationwide organizational network.  CYDF 
launched its network in 1990, completed the basic framework by 1995, and currently 
has developed a bulky network covering 33 province-level branches.  Furthermore, 
this network relies on one of CYDF’s supervision units, China’s Communist Youth 
League (CCYL)’s organizational network for operating.  In fact, all of CYDF’s 
province-level branches are just the CCYL branches’ copy with a different name.  




Publicity dependency of NGOs on the government is unique in China.  As a 
communist and totalitarian state, the government controls to a great extent what 
should and should not be said by the media.  The state owns large shares of stocks 
for almost all large-scale media corporations.  Those with direct state-attachment are 
called “voice of the Party.”  If not owned directly by the government, the media must 
go through a very strict censorship system prior to publication or broadcast.  A 
media corporation has to pay a penalty if anything that “should not be publicized” is 
by one of its media units. 
NGOs, especially those without legal status, work closely with the media to earn 
public recognition and cultivate a reputation for themselves and their projects.  
NGOs publicize their activities with the aim of attracting greater public participation 
and attaining greater social influence.  “NGOs, especially bottom-up NGOs, grow 
their social influence mostly though the media…Meanwhile, media is also the tool for 
them to attain social recognition (especially for those non-registered grassroots 
NGOs).”55  The NGORC survey highlighted the affinity between the media and 
NGOs in China.  In its survey, 67.8% NGOs received media attention in the previous 
year, 28.4% had not received media attention in the previous year, and 3.8% did not 
answer the question. 
                                                        
54 Shen Yuan, Sun Wusan, “Institutions’ Different Contents with the Same Appearance and Social Organizations’ 
Development, (zhidu de xingtongyizhi yu shehui tuanti fayu,” in China Youth Development Foundation ed., 
China’s Social Organizations at the Crossing (chuyu shizi lukou de zhongguo shetuan), (Tianjin, Tianjin People’s 
Press). also see at http://www.cydf.org.cn/gb/conference/speech/paper-c/17.htm, accessed on February 7, 2005. 
55 Deng Shengguo, “Report on the Survey on NGOs in China,” Case Study on China’s NGOs 2001, UNCRD 
Research Report Series No. 43, (China: Tsinghua University NGO Research Center, 2001), p.22. 
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As a result, NGOs have to depend on the government-controlled media to 
publicize their organization and works.  This is how publicity dependency develops.  
The government, based on its own interest, determines what NGOs and what events 
should be the media’s favorites.  Therefore, news about any NGO-organized, 
anti-government activity in China will not reach the public.   
Following the “Project Hope” example, the great success of the project not only 
owes to the state’s operational network support, but also to its support on the project’s 
publicity.  People’s Daily and China Central Television, these “voices of the Party,” 
started the publicizing campaign on the “Project Hope” in the 1990s.  The then 
president of the state, Jiang Zeming, made a personal donation.  Several national 
leaders followed.  Without all the sponsors and publicity efforts from the state 
leaders and its directly attached media, “Project Hope” would not have become as 




 This chapter presented all NGO background-related topics.  I introduced 
government policies (the one system, two principles), NGO classification (top-down 
and bottom-up NGOs, as well as four different NGO registration types), and the five 
forms of NGO’s interaction with the government.  The next chapter will proceed to 
the measures to all the variables related, in preparation for the application of these 
                                                        
56 Ibid. 
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Chapter Three: Measurements 
 
In this chapter, I introduce the independent variable, the dependent variable, the 
control variables, and their respective measurements.  All measures, either 
quantitative or qualitative, are to be used synthetically in Chapter four to test the 
correlations between the independent variable and the dependent variable. 
State-NGO relations, serving as the independent variable, have five different 
perspectives: the funding dependency, organizational dependency, human resources 
dependency, operational dependency and the publicity dependency, as defined in 
Chapter two.  The particular measures of the five forms of state-NGO relations, as 
listed in Table 3.1 below, will be presented in greater detail.  The dependent variable 
is NGO efficacy.  The three measurements of NGO efficacy as listed in Table 3.1 
below, to what extent an NGO’s goals are achieved, to what extent an NGO has 
influenced the government policies, as well as enterprise policies, will also be 
presented in this chapter.  
For the independent and dependent variables, three major questions will be 
addressed and answered.  First, why is each variable important?  Second, how will I 
measure each variable?  And third, why do I measure the variable in the way that I 
do?  
The control variables are the working field, the office location, the yearly 
expenditure scale and the geographic functional scope.  The reasons why these 






1) Office: provided by the superintendent 
government unit or else; Quantitative; Nominal 
2) Financial Dependency: percentage of 
government sponsorship; Quantitative; Interval 
B) 
Organizational dependency 
1) Registration type: Formally registered NGOs, 
taxed NGOs, student clubs, or underground 
NGOs; Quantitative; Nominal 
2) Organizational framework set-up: Qualitative 
3) Constitution:  
¾ The Making: set down by the NGO itself, 
drafted by the NGO and ratified by the 
government, or solely set down by the 
government; Quantitative; Nominal 
¾ The Content: obligations of NGOs to the 
state prescribed; Qualitative.              
C)  
Human Resources Dependency
1) Personal network: previous working experience 
or concurrent position in government, or else; 
Quantitative; Ordinal                         
2) Recruitment of the head and cadres; 
Quantitative; Nominal 
3) Personnel welfare: Whether belong to the state’s 
civil servants welfare and compensation system; 
Qualitative. 












E) Publicity Dependency Qualitative. 
1) To what extent the organization’s goals are 
achieved: Qualitative 
2) Strength in influencing government policies 
The amount and the effect of the proposal(s) an 






Dependent Variable: NGO’s efficacy 
3) Strength in influencing enterprises’ policies 
The amount and the effect of the proposal(s) an 
NGO bring forward to the enterprises, if any; 
Quantitative; Ordinal 
A) Working field  Chinese local environmental NGOs 










The NGO functions within: 
one city, district or county; or 
one province, autonomous district or municipal 
city; or 
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two or more provinces, autonomous districts or 
municipal cities; or 
China mainland; or 
Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and mainland; or 






Yearly Expenditure Scale 
The NGO’s annual expenditure scale: less than￥1000, 
between 1000-5,000, 5,000-10,000, 10,000 -50,000, 
50,000 -100,000, or 100,000-500,000                 
Table 3.1: List of all variables and respective measures 
 
The Independent Variable – State-NGO Relations 
 
Funding Dependency 
 Funding, as one of the most commonly used interfering tools applied by the state 
to NGOs, can either undermine an NGO’s independency in its vital decision-making 
and disturb its functions, or create a certain affinity between an NGO and the state 
which may in turn benefit NGO’ development.  Therefore, to understand how 
available funds affects NGO efficacy, the level of funding dependency on the state 
must be measured. 
 As I mentioned in Chapter two, government funding can take numerous forms.  
According to the survey I conducted, financial support is the chief form of 
government funding; other funding takes the form of supplies, chiefly office space.  
Monetary donations and office provisions comprise the two measures for the NGO 
funding dependency variable.  These two measures are taken because they cover the 
major forms of funding dependency of an NGO on the government and best imitate 
the concept of funding dependency I outlined in Chapter two. 
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1) Financial dependency in the form of monetary donations 
 Financial dependency is the most direct indicator of an NGO’s dependency on its 
government superintendent unit.  From the frequencies table57 below, I conclude 
that a number of Chinese environmental NGOs enjoy financial independence from 
government control, while a few others heavily depend on their government 
superintendent units (mostly above 50%). 
 
NGO’s financial 
dependency (%)  
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 13 65.0 65.0
30 1 5.0 70.0
50 1 5.0 75.0
72 1 5.0 80.0
80 1 5.0 85.0
95 1 5.0 90.0
100 2 10.0 100.0
Total 20 100.0
Table 3.2: Frequency table for NGO’s financial dependency 
With further examination, I find that NGOs that enjoy zero government 
sponsorships are distributed evenly among the four registration types. [See Table 3.3]. 
Approximately half of the formally registered NGOs and half of the student clubs, as 
well as 100% of the taxed NGOs and non-registered NGOs, own complete financial 
freedom from their government superintendent units.  The other two formally 
registered NGOs draw a moderate amount of funding from their government 
superintendent units while four other student clubs depend greatly on their 
superintendent units from the university. 
                                                        
57 All tables come from the data analysis of the survey I conducted from August through November 2004. 
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Finance58   Total
% 0 30 50 72 80 95 100 
Registration 1 3 1 1   5
2 1   1
3 6 1 1 1 2 11
4 3   3
Total 13 1 1 1 1 1 2 20
Registration:  1: Ministry of Civil Affairs registered NGOs 
   2: Enterprise-like taxed NGOs 
   3: Student clubs 
   4: Non-registered underground NGOs 
 
Table 3.3: Crosstabulation of registration type and financial dependency 
 
Geographic functional scope, which will be discussed later as one of the control 
variables, refers to the geographic area scope in which an NGO normally functions, 
for example within one city, district or county, or both domestic and abroad.  
Through investigating the crossovers of an NGO’s geographic functional scope and its 
financial dependency [Table 3.4], I find that the most financially independent NGOs – 
those with zero government sponsorship -- are distributed evenly across different 
levels of geographic scopes.  For example, the heavily dependent NGOs function 












                                                        
58 For “financial dependency.” 
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 Finance  Total
 0 30 50 72 80 95 100 
SCOPE A 3 1 1 1 6
B 3 1  4
C 3  3
D 3 1 1 5
E 1  1
F 1  1
Total  13 1 1 1 1 1 2 20
Scope:  A: one city, district or county 
   B: one province, autonomous district or municipal city 
   C: two or more provinces, autonomous districts or municipal cities 
   D: China mainland 
   E: Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and mainland 
   F: Domestic and abroad 
 
Table 3.4: Crosstabulation of the geographic functional scope and the financial dependency 
 
The yearly expenditure scale, another control variable, refers to an NGO’s annual 
expenditure.  The ranges of expenditure I use are  less than RMB￥ 1000, 
￥ 1000–5,000, ￥ 5,000–10,000, ￥ 10,000–50,000, ￥ 50,000–100,000, and 
￥100,000–500,000.  Through studying the intersections of NGOs’ expenditure 
scales and financial dependencies [Table 3.5], I show that NGOs, who depend in some 
way on government sponsorship, are more dependent and have smaller expenditure 
scales.  The less an NGO depends on government sponsorship, the less dependent 







 Finance  Total
 0 30 50 72 80 95 100 
SCALE 1 3 1 4
2 2 1  3
3 1 1 1 3
4 3  3
5 2  2
6 2  2
7 1  1
8 1  1
9 1  1
Total  13 1 1 1 1 1 2 20
1.                Below ￥1000  6.            ￥100,000-500,000 
2.                ￥1000-5,000  7.            ￥500,000-1000,000 
3.                ￥5,000-10,000 8.            ￥1,000,000-5,000,000 
4.                ￥10,000 -50,000  9.            ￥5,000,000-10,000,000 
5.                ￥50,000 -100,000 10.           Above￥10,000,000 
 
Table 3.5: Crosstabulation of the yearly expenditure scale and the financial dependency 
 
2) Office 
 The provision of offices is a component of government funding.  Whether or not 










Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent
Office 1 1 5.0 5.0 5.0
2 3 15.0 15.0 20.0
3 5 25.0 25.0 45.0
4 1 5.0 5.0 50.0
5 10 50.0 50.0 100.0
Total 20 100.0 100.0
1: In the organization’s leader’s or member’s personal house 
2: Office provided by the superintendent department of the government 
3: Rented office 
4: Owned office 
5: have no office 
6: other 
 
Table 3.6: Frequency table for office 
 
As shown in Table 3.6, among the twenty NGOs in my study, three NGOs’ offices 
(15%) are provided by their superintendent government agencies, whereas the 
remaining NGOs find offices on their own or have no office at all.  Besides the 
NGOs’ degree of dependency on the government, one can also see that unsatisfactory 
working conditions exist in a great number of NGOs.  NGOs with better conditions, 
e.g. possess an office, are those with larger geographic scope, as shown in Table 3.7.  
In Table 3.8, one sees that NGOs without offices are often student clubs.  
Surprisingly, two of the three NGOs that depend on their superintendent government 








A B C D E F 
OFFICE 1 1  1
2 1 1 1  3
3  2 2 1 5
4  1  1
5 4 2 2 2  10
Total 6 4 3 5 1 1 20
Office: 1: In the organization’s leader’s or member’s personal house 
2: Office provided by the superintendent department of the government 
3: Rented office 
4: Owned office 
5: have no office 
6: other 
Scope:  A: one city, district or county 
   B: one province, autonomous district or municipal city 
   C: two or more provinces, autonomous districts or municipal cities 
   D: China mainland 
   E: Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and mainland 
   F: Domestic and abroad 
 
Table 3.7: Crosstabulation of office and geographic functional scope 
 
OFFICE  Total
1 2 3 4 5 
Registration 1 1 2 1 1 5
2 1  1
3 1 2 8 11
4 2 1 3
Total 1 3 5 1 10 20
Registration:  1: Ministry of Civil Affairs registered NGOs 
   2: Enterprise-like taxed NGOs 
   3: Student clubs 
   4: Non-registered underground NGOs 
 




Organizational dependency, as defined in Chapter two, originates from state 
control of NGOs through the Registration Management Agencies and Professional 
Leading Units.  Organizational dependency of NGOs can result in bureaucratic 
red-tape, low efficiency, loss of motivation, and deviation from the original objectives 
of the NGO.  Conversely, organizational dependency of NGOs might also make it 
convenient for certain beneficial state-NGO interactions to develop.  To test how an 
NGO’s organizational dependency affects its efficacy, I first measure organizational 
dependency as a variable.  I chose three measures to gauge organizational 
dependency: NGO registration type, organizational framework and set-up, and 
constitutional development and content. 
1) NGO Registration Type 
There are primarily four different registration groups for NGOs: formally 
registered NGOs, corporation-like taxed NGOs, student organizations, and 
underground NGOs.  Registration is chosen to measure the organizational 
dependency because the registration type almost always determines the type of 
institutional controls imposed on NGOs by the state.  Formally registered NGOs 
must have at least one Registration Management Agency and Professional Leading 
Unit which are both responsible for the supervision of the NGO.  Taxed NGOs, 
although registered as an NGO, can never publicly declare its NGO status.  In this 
aspect, taxed NGOs often lack public support, yet much freer from government 
supervision.  Student organizations, registered within a school, can only function 
within the campus.  The students’ limited devotion to the organization due to their 
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study loads, the limited resources available to them, and the groups’ limited functional 
scope within the campuses, all constrain these groups’ efficacies.  Yet, in another 
aspect, most universities provide a relatively freer and more encouraging atmosphere 
in which the groups can develop.  Underground NGOs are the freest among the four 
NGO groups; however, their lack of legal status constitutes the biggest barrier against 
their development, either by limiting funding resources or constructing public 
recognition. 
 Of the twenty local NGOs surveyed, five are registered at the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, one is registered at the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, eleven are 
registered at schools or other public institutions59, and three chose the item “others.” 
[See Figure 1].  This indicates that only 25% NGOs surveyed are formally registered 
at the Ministry of Civil Affairs.   5% are Ministry of Industry and Commerce 
registered NGOs that must pay taxes to exist.   55% are student clubs registered 
only at the universities; and the remaining 15% are probably registered to nowhere 
because of the difficulties of NGOs’ registration brought by the dual management 
system and the non-competition principle.  On the other hand, these non-registered 




                                                        
59 Currently there are three kinds of public institutions in China.  One shoulders some administrative functions or 
serves for the government departments, mainly in areas of supervision, quality inspection, authorization or logistic 
services.  Another is serving the market and enterprises through consultation and co-ordination services.  The 
third, which represents the majority, is engaged in public services, including education, public health, science and 











Figure 1: Percentage of each registration typed NGOs 
 
2) Organizational Framework Set-up 
 As defined in Chapter two, organizational framework set-up pertains to how an 
organization divides itself into different sections, how each section functions and 
cooperates with the others, as well as institutions within the organization.  Based on 
descriptions of organizational framework set-up provided by the NGOs in my survey, 
I will examine how similar the set-up is to that of its government superintendent unit 
(GSU), and whether or not copying the GSU set-up is helpful to the NGO. 
 
3) Constitutional Development and Content 
This measure of organizational dependency includes both the making and the 
content of the constitutions of NGOs.  The making of an NGO’s constitution could 
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be interfered with completely, partially or not at all by the state.  The content of an 
NGO’s constitution is a qualitative measure designed to see what obligations to the 
state are prescribed in the constitution’s text and to what degree the NGO is subject to 
the obligations prescribed in the constitution.  I chose this measure because both the 
making and the content of an NGO’s constitution bear vital meanings to an NGO’s 
organizational set-up.  They embody the startup point and the base of an NGO’s 
organizational framework. 
None of the NGOs surveyed has no constitution at all.  Only one NGO has an 
unwritten constitution.  Of the others who have a written constitution, none of the 
constitutions were set down solely by the NGOs’ superintendent government 
departments.  Although two NGOs conciliated with their superiors for their 
constitutions, the majority of NGOs either wrote the draft by themselves and are 
waiting for it to be ratified by their superiors or wrote and passed the constitution 










Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent
Constitution 2 1 5.0 5.0 5.0
4 2 10.0 10.0 15.0
5 8 40.0 40.0 55.0
6 9 45.0 45.0 100.0
Total 20 100.0 100.0
1. Has no constitution at all  
2. Has an unwritten constitution formed by persistent practice and usage 
3. Has a written constitution which was set down solely by the superintendent government department  
4. Has a written constitution which was set down by the superintendent government department and your 
organization together in conciliation 
5. Has a written constitution which was drafted out by your organization and ratified by the superintendent 
government department  
6. Has a written constitution which was constituted by your organization on your own 
 
Table 3.9: Frequency table for constitution making 
 
Human Resources Dependency 
 State control over NGOs can be manifested through influencing NGOs’ human 
resources.  The human resources dependency of an NGO on the government can be a 
double-edged sword, either discouraging the staff’s work ethics or expanding the 
organization’s networks for higher efficiency and making better salaries available to 
attract more talents.  To find out how an NGO’s human resources dependency 
correlates with its efficacy, I measure the human resources dependency as a variable. 
As introduced in Chapter two, human resources-related government control over 
NGOs can take three approaches.  Each organization’s head, or cadres, network 
personally with the government through working with the government either in the 
past or concurrently.  The government might interfere with an NGOs’ recruitment of 
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a new head or new cadres.  Moreover, some NGOs’ personnel’s welfare and 
compensation might be provided by the government funds.  Thus, personal networks, 
recruitment of the head and cadres, as well as the personnel welfare, comprise the 
three measures for the human resources dependency.  The former two are measured 
quantitatively whereas the latter one is measured qualitatively. 
 
1) Personal network 
 This variable measures an NGO’s relations with the government on a personal 
basis, judging from whether or not an NGO’s leader has previously worked for the 
government or holds a concurrent position in the government.  I take this measure 
because the work experience of the head of an NGO marks the NGO’s personal 
network abilities, which has a strong influence on the NGO’s operational efficiencies 
due to the significance of networking in a Chinese society. 
When examining the previous work experience of the head of the organization, 
besides the eleven student clubs which are not included, two stated that their heads 
used to work in government, four previously worked for enterprises, and three worked 












Figure 2: Percentage of the previous work experience of the head of NGOs 
 
Supplementary to their past work experiences, some NGO leaders continue to 
hold positions at other places during their tenure at the NGOs.  According to the 
survey results, as shown in Table 3.10, leaders of 20% of the NGOs surveyed hold 
concurrent posts in the government (type 1), 10% in enterprises (either profit or 








Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent
1 4 20.0 20.0 20.0
2 2 10.0 10.0 30.0
3 3 15.0 15.0 45.0
4 11 55.0 55.0 100.0
Total 20 100.0 100.0 
1. government       2. enterprises         3. other NGOs         4. no elsewhere 
 
Table 3.10: Concurrent posts elsewhere of the heads of the NGOs 
 
 Further examination of the relationship between the personal networks of the 
leadership and the registration types of the NGOs, as shown in Table 3.11, reveals that 
the majority of NGOs whose leaders hold no concurrent posts are student clubs, 
which is very reasonable.  The head of the only taxed NGO in my sample works in 
another NGO concurrently.  Two formally registered NGOs’ leaders and two student 
leaders work for the government simultaneously.  One formally registered and one 
non-registered NGOs’ leader works for enterprises meanwhile.  One formally 
registered, one taxed and one non-registered NGOs’ heads also work in other NGOs.  
One formally registered NGO’s, nine student clubs’ and one non-registered NGO’s 









 HEAD  Total
 1 2 3 4 
Registration 1 2 1 1 1 5
2 1  1
3 2 9 11
4 1 1 1 3
Total  4 2 3 11 20
Registration:  1: Ministry of Civil Affairs registered NGOs 
   2: Enterprise-like taxed NGOs 
   3: Student clubs 
   4: Non-registered underground NGOs 
 
Table 3.11: Crosstabulation of registration type and concurrent posts elsewhere of the heads of the NGOs 
 
The crosstabulation in Table 3.12 investigates the relationships between NGOs’ 
personal networks and expenditure scales.  Surprisingly, one can see distributions of 
the numbers in Table 3.12 approximate slopes from the lower-left side to the 
upper-right side.  This implies that, as the area in which an NGO’s leader holds a 
post concurrently changes, from the government to enterprises to other NGOs and 
nowhere else, the NGO’s scale decreases.  In other words, NGOs, whose leaders also 
work for the government, have the largest scale.  Following that are NGOs whose 
leaders concurrently work for enterprises or other NGOs.  The smallest NGOs are 
those whose leaders work nowhere else, mainly the student clubs.  This observation 






 HEAD  Total
 1 2 3 4 
SCALE 1 4 4
2 1 2 3
3 2 1 3
4 1 2 3
5 1 1 2
6 1 1  2
7 1 1
8 1  1
9 1  1
Total  4 2 3 11 20
 
Table 3.12: Crosstabulation of yearly expenditure scale and concurrent posts elsewhere of the heads of the 
NGOs 
 
2) Recruitment of the head and cadres 
 State interference into an NGO’s recruitment of a new head and/or cadres can 
take several forms, from direct assignment to ratifying the NGO-recommended 
nominees to standing by.  I chose this measure because the level of state interference 
with an NGO’s recruitment of a new head and/or cadres roughly shapes the whole 
picture of NGOs’ human resources dependency. 
As illustrated/shown in Table 3.13, none of the heads of the twenty NGOs were 
assigned or designated by their superintendent government agencies, which assures 
their basic independency on personnel arrangement.  However, one organization in 
the twenty NGOs had to have its newly elected head ratified by its superintendent 
government agency.  Tracking back to this NGO’s registration type and geographic 
active scope, it turns out to be a formally registered organization with the largest 
geographic functional scope (domestic and abroad).  The majority, area 3 and area 4 
[see Figure 3], are those that enjoy the independency in choosing a leader, though 
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with different degrees of democracy. 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent
Valid 2 1 5.0 5.6 5.6
3 8 40.0 44.4 50.0
4 8  40.0 44.4 94.4
5 1 5.0 5.6 100.0
Total 18 90.0 100.0
Missing System 2 10.0
Total 20 100.0
1. The head was assigned or designated by the superintendent government agencies 
2. The head was nominated by the organization’s previous principal and ratified by the superintendent 
department of the government 
3. The head was nominated by the organization’s previous principal and agreed by the main cadres 
4. The head was elected democratically within the whole organization 
5. Other 




















1.  The head was assigned or designated by the superintendent government agencies 
2. The head was nominated by the organization’s previous principal and ratified by the superintendent 
department of the government 
3. The head was nominated by the organization’s previous principal and agreed by the main cadres 
4. The head was elected democratically within the whole organization 
5. Other 
Figure 3: Percentage of degrees of state intervention on NGOs’ recruitment of a new head 
 
Table 3.14 shows that the cadres’ recruitment follows the same track with that of 
the heads: the majority falls into the types of being elected by the NGO itself.  The 
one NGO in type 2 (ratified by the government) is formally registered.  Quite 
surprisingly, the one NGO in type 1, with its cadres nominated or designated by the 





Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent
Valid 1 1 5.0 5.6 5.6
2 1 5.0 5.6 11.1
3 9 45.0 50.0 61.1
4 5 25.0 27.8 88.9
5 2 10.0 11.1 100.0
Total 18 90.0 100.0
Missing System 2 10.0
Total 20 100.0
1. The cadres were assigned and designated by the superintendent government department 
2. The cadres were nominated by the organization’s principal and ratified by the superintendent department of the 
government 
3. The cadres were nominated by the organization’s principal and agreed by the main cadres 
4. The cadres were elected democratically according to the organization’s constitution 
5. Other  
Table 3.14: Frequency table for state intervention on NGOs’ recruitment of new cadres 
 
3) Personnel Welfare 
 Personnel welfare, utilized in Chapter four, is measured qualitatively from 
interview accounts and examines what percent of an NGO’s staff belong to the civil 
servants welfare and compensation system.  This measurement is important because 
if an NGO staff’s is included in the state budget, this further extends government 
control over NGO human resources autonomy. 
 
Operational Dependency 
Operational dependency, as one form of NGO dependency on the state, has the 
most direct impact on an NGO’s efficacy.  To understand how operational 
dependency affects an NGO’s efficacy, I first measure the operational dependency as 
a variable.  As stated in Chapter two, an NGO’s operational dependency involves 
 58
interrupted internal decision-making and daily activities-conducting, as well as its 
operational network dependency on the state.  Therefore, descriptive accounts on the 
means and degrees of interference on an NGO’s daily operations, as well as accounts 
on the extent of an NGO’s network dependency, are the major measures for 
determining the NGO’s operational dependency on the state.   
 
Publicity Dependency 
Publicity dependency of NGOs on the government takes two different forms.  
One is through contacts with well-known political figures.  Formal meetings with 
these media favorites will automatically draw the attention of the media, and help to 
enhance an NGO’s recognition and reputation.  The second is through reports of the 
organization or works which are released by government-affiliated media.  Although 
it is difficult to tell the specific degree of government control over specific media, it is 
known that most large-scale media are government-controlled; specific examples 
include the China Central Television (CCTV), People’s Daily, and the China Radio 
Broadcast.  Therefore, accounts of meetings between NGO leaders and national 
political leaders, as well as media lists giving all media units that have reported on an 
NGO or its works, serve as measures for an NGO’s publicity dependency on the state. 
 
The Dependent Variable – NGO Efficacy 
 
 The thesis’ dependent variable – NGO efficacy – is measured synthetically by the 
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extent of how well NGO goals are achieved and how well an NGO influences the 
government and enterprises.  These two measurements are justified by the 3Es 
theory.  Measuring how well the NGOs have achieved their goals measures the 
efficiency of the organization.  Measuring their influences on the government and 
enterprise measures the effectiveness of the organization. 
 One important measurement missing is the public view on NGO efficacy, as 
mentioned in the “limitations” part of Chapter one.  This is the most objective 
evaluation of NGO’s efficacy; however, due to the time constraint, this measure is left 
behind for future researchers.  Despite the lack of information on the public view of 
NGO efficacy, the two measurements are sufficient to assess NGO efficacy. 
1)  To What Extent the Organization’s Goals Are Achieved 
Organizations prescribe their goals in their constitutions, or, if lacking a 
constitution, I determined an organization’s goals through interviews.  I refer to the 
constitutions or interview records for an organization’s goals; I judge from the scale, 
the content and the influence of its activities to determine how well the goals are 
achieved.   
 
2) Influence on government 
The most direct and primary influence of NGOs on government is through 
proposals, either conversational between leaders or written through formal channels.  
The government, upon receiving a proposal from an NGO, can either ignore it, or 
responds to it.  If the government accepts the proposal, it can take responsive 
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measures, either in spoken or unspoken ways.  The questions in my survey ask about 
the amount and the effect of the proposals that an NGO submits to the government, if 
any.  The effect of the proposal is assessed by the percentage of proposals responded 
to or accepted in any form among all that were sent out.  I then multiplied the 
amount of proposals brought forward in total with the percentage of proposals 
responded to or accepted and hereby mark each NGO’s influence to the government.  
The results are marked at the second left column of Table 3.15, i.e. 0, 1, 2, 6, and 9.  
Under the “Frequency” column, the numbers of cases for all results are marked.  
Percentage of each result is also given and illustrated [see Figure 4].  The mean of all 
the results are 1.70, with a standard deviation of 2.89.  [See Table 3.16].   
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent
Valid 0 11 55.0 55.0 55.0
1 2 10.0 10.0 65.0
2 4 20.0 20.0 85.0
6 1 5.0 5.0 90.0
9 2 10.0 10.0 100.0
Total 20 100.0 100.0
Table 3.15: Frequency table for NGO’s influence to the government 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation












Figure 4: Percentage distribution of NGO’s influence to the government 
3) Influence on the enterprises 
 NGO influence on enterprise is assessed in the same way as influences on the 
government.  I multiplied the total amount of proposals submitted to the enterprises 
by NGOs with the percentage of proposals responded to or accepted by enterprises 
and hereby mark each NGO’s influence on enterprise.  Results are shown below in 
Table 3.17, Table 3.18 and Figure 5.  As we can see, NGOs generally exert less 
influence to enterprise than to the government. 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent
Valid 0 15 75.0 75.0 75.0
1 2 10.0 10.0 85.0
2 1 5.0 5.0 90.0
3 1 5.0 5.0 95.0
4 1 5.0 5.0 100.0
Total 20 100.0 100.0
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Table 3.17: Frequency table for NGO’s influence on enterprise 
 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation












Figure 5: Percentage distribution of NGO’s influence on enterprise 
 
The Control Variables 
 
Working Field & Office Location 
All twenty NGOs engage in the field of environmental protection and are located 
in Beijing or Shanghai.  As explained in the “methodology” part of Chapter one, I 
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chose the environmental field because it has a larger number of observations due to its 
political irrelevance and smaller likelihood of confrontation.  I chose the cities of 
Beijing and Shanghai for two reasons – the large number of observations available in 
these areas and the great differences that exist between NGOs located in Beijing or 
Shanghai and those located in less urbanized areas in China.  It is crucial to 
distinguish the two and focus on the choice/cities with more available observations. 
 
Geographic Functional Scope 
Geographic functional scope interacts with registration type, one measure of the 
organizational dependency [see Figure 6].  Therefore, I need to control this variable 
in my comparisons.  Among the twenty NGOs surveyed, six function within one city, 
district or county, four within one province, autonomous district or municipal city, 
three within two or more provinces, autonomous districts or municipal cities, five 
within China mainland, one within the area of Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and 


















Scope:  A: one city, district or county 
   B: one province, autonomous district or municipal city 
   C: two or more provinces, autonomous districts or municipal cities 
   D: China mainland 
   E: Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and mainland 
   F: Domestic and abroad 
 
Figure 6: Bar chart for the geographic functional scope 
 
As shown in Figure 6, with the exception of the NGO “within China mainland,” 
fewer NGOs operate at levels of greater geographic scope.  Therefore, the majority 
of NGOs surveyed function within a limited geographic scope.  In other words, 
relatively few NGOs function within a large scope, such as across-province or 
internationally.  Moreover, both the NGOs in categories E and F (with a larger active 
scope) are formally registered at the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and two NGOs among 
give in category D (within mainland China) are also formally registered.  As shown 
in the crosstabulation below, most formally registered NGOs function within larger 
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scopes; most student clubs and underground non-registered NGOs have a 
geographically limited functional scope.  [See Table 3.19]. 
 
SCOPE Total
A B C D E F
registration 1  1 2 1 1 5
2  1 1
3 6 1 3 1 11
4  2 1 3
Total 6 4 3 5 1 1 20
Registration:  1: Ministry of Civil Affairs registered NGOs 
   2: Enterprise-like taxed NGOs 
   3: Student clubs 
   4: Non-registered underground NGOs 
Scope: A: one city, district or county 
   B: one province, autonomous district or municipal city 
   C: two or more provinces, autonomous districts or municipal cities 
   D: China mainland 
   E: Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and mainland 
   F: Domestic and abroad 
 
Table 3.19: Crosstabulation of registration type and geographic functional scope 
 
Yearly Expenditure Scale 
Other than its geographic operating area, an NGO’s yearly expenditure scale can 
also be used as an indicator of organizational scope.  Similar to the geographic 
functional scope, the yearly expenditure scale interacts with registration type, too.  
Therefore, I controlled this variable. 
As shown in Table 3.20, the number of cases gradually decreases as the scope of 
the expenditure scale increases.  An average-sized NGO has a yearly expenditure of 
RMB ￥10,000 – 50,000 [see the mean in Table 3.21]. 
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Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent
Valid 1 4 20.0 20.0 20.0
2 3 15.0 15.0 35.0
3 3 15.0 15.0 50.0
4 3 15.0 15.0 65.0
5 2 10.0 10.0 75.0
6 2 10.0 10.0 85.0
7 1 5.0 5.0 90.0
8 1 5.0 5.0 95.0
9 1 5.0 5.0 100.0
Total 20 100.0 100.0
1.                Below ￥1000  6.            ￥100,000-500,000 
2.                ￥1000-5,000  7.            ￥500,000-1000,000 
3.                ￥5,000-10,000 8.            ￥1,000,000-5,000,000 
4.                ￥10,000 -50,000  9.            ￥5,000,000-10,000,000 
5.                ￥50,000 -100,000 10.           Above￥10,000,000 
 
Table 3.20: Frequency table for yearly expenditure scale 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation





Table 3.21: Descriptive statistics on the yearly expenditure scale 
 
The crosstabulation of expenditure scale and registration type, shown in Table 
3.22, reaffirms the observations drawn from the geographic active scope measure: 
formally registered NGOs and enterprise-like NGOs have larger expenditure scales, 







 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Registration 1  1 1 1 1 1 5
2  1 1
3 4 2 3 2 11
4  1 2 3
Total  4 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 20
1.                Below ￥1000  6.            ￥100,000-500,000 
2.                ￥1000-5,000  7.            ￥500,000-1000,000 
3.                ￥5,000-10,000 8.            ￥1,000,000-5,000,000 
4.                ￥10,000 -50,000  9.            ￥5,000,000-10,000,000 
5.                ￥50,000 -100,000 10.           Above￥10,000,000 
Registration:  1: Ministry of Civil Affairs registered NGOs 
   2: Enterprise-like taxed NGOs 
   3: Student clubs 
   4: Non-registered underground NGOs 
 




 This chapter elaborated the measures for the independent variable, dependent 
variable and control variables, some quantitative and others qualitative.  Quantitative 
measures were supplemented with data from survey.  In next chapter, quantitative 
measures will be combined for each variable to do regressions and qualitative 







Chapter Four: Correlations 
 
In this chapter, I will test the correlation between NGO dependency on the state 
and NGO efficacy both quantitatively and qualitatively.  Quantitative measures 
illustrated in Chapter three will be combined for each variable to make regressions 
and the significance of the correlations will be evaluated.  In addition, I will be 
discussing several case studies in greater detail.  Three of the twenty cases from my 
study will be discussed and compared to highlight the relationship between each form 
of NGO dependency on the state and NGO efficacy. 
 For the quantitative analysis, I calculated the values of each variable using the 
following methods.  NGO efficacy is equal to the sum of an NGO’s strength in 
influencing government and enterprise.  Funding dependency equals the percentage 
of government financial support multiplied by two if the NGO’s office is provided by 
the government; if the office is not provided, funding dependency takes the same 
value as the percentage of government financial support.  Registration type and 
constitution-making will be ranked according to their reflected degree of NGO 
dependency.  Organizational dependency is calculated by multiplying the ranking 
number of the two.  Again, the NGO leader’s personal network and the recruitment 
of head and cadres will be ranked according to their reflected degree of NGO 
dependency on the state.  Human resources dependency is calculated by multiplying 
the ranking numbers of the two. 
For the qualitative analysis, cases will be chosen from the same twenty 
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observations as in the quantitative analysis and use the same values for the control 
variables, but different values for the independent variable.  6 cases in total will be 
compared in three different groups.  In addition to all NGOs being focused on 
environmental protection and located in Beijing or Shanghai, all cases in each 
comparison group share the same or approximate level of geographic functional scope 
and yearly expenditure scale.  Selected cases must have different values for one type 
of dependency when the correlation between that dependency and NGO efficacy is 
being assessed. 
1) Funding Dependency 
Quantitative – General 
Funding Dependency NGO Efficacy
Funding Dependency Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.210
 Sig. (2-tailed) . .375
 N 20 20
NGO Efficacy Pearson Correlation -.210 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .375 .
N 20 20





 0 1 2 3 10 12 
Funding
Dependency
.00 6 2 1 2 1 12
.30  1  1
.50 1  1
.72  1  1
.80 1  1
.95 1  1
1.00 1 1  2
1.50  1  1
Total  10 2 4 1 2 1 20
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Table 4.2: Cross-tabulation between the funding dependency and efficacy 
Table 4.1 shows the significance of the correlation between funding dependency 
and NGO efficacy; the correlation is not significant60.  From the cross-tabulation of 
the funding dependency and NGO’s efficacy, no trend of the numbers’ distribution can 
be found, either. [See Table 4.2].  Based on the lack of a significant correlation, one 
might believe no relationship exists between funding dependency and NGO efficacy.  
However, I will attempt to show a relationship through qualitative analysis. 
 
Qualitative – Two Groups, Five Cases 
Using qualitative analysis, I will make two comparisons using five cases -- two in 
smaller (group A) and the other three in larger scales (group B).  By making the 
comparisons separately, I discover/conclude that small NGOs face completely 
different situations than large NGOs.  For small NGOs, funding dependency on 
the superintendent department actually leads to higher efficacy, compared to no 
government funding at all and not differentiating between the degrees of 
dependency.  For large-scale NGOs, funding dependency has a negative 
correlation with efficacy.  In other words, the more financially dependent a 
large-scale NGO is on the government, the lower its efficacy. 
 
Comparison Group A 
Since scales of cases are small and the needed funding is accordingly little, the 
                                                        
60  Normally, correlations are significant if the significance value falls below 0.05.  Correlations are not 
acceptable when the significance value goes beyond 0.1. 
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difference in the degrees of dependency is negligible, and therefore ignored.  While 
NOT differentiating the degrees of the dependency, I compare NGOs that receive 
government funding and those that do not receive government funding. 
“The Lvyuan Roots and Shoots” at China University of Mining and Technology 
(Case A1) and “the Feiyu Association” at Peking University Health Science Center 
(Case A2), are both environmental student organizations in Beijing.  Case A1 
functions within mainland China, while Case A2 operates within two or more 
provinces, autonomous districts or municipal cities.  Both expended less than RMB 
￥1000 in the year 2003.  Cases in Group A receive different degrees of government 
funding.  Case A1 depends 100% on “government” funding, which means funding 
from the university’s superintendent department.  Case A2 receives none of its 
funding from the superintendent department, rather 10% of its income comes from 
membership fees and the rest from participant/member activity fees.61 
Looking at Group A’s efficacies, Case A1, which depends on government funding, 
appears to have greater efficacy than Case A2, which enjoys financial independence 
from the government.  Much evidence supports this conclusion. 
First, I examine the extent to which each organization’s goals are achieved.  
Both Case A1 and A2 aim to promote environmental consciousness among the 
students and nearby communities.  Case A1 chiefly engages in communal 
environmental education and fieldwork researches.  Established in June 2003, case 
A1 has already conducted several extensive activities, including a small water quality 
                                                        
61 Data from questionnaire. 
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investigation project of the Huai River; the first “Zero Waste Environmental 
Education” project on campus in Beijing; and the “Clean up the World -- Xuchang 
Action.”  Most of the activities received media attention from television, radio, and 
newspapers, including reports on China Education Television and China Central 
Television.  The public applauded its activities as well.62  The majority of Case 
A2’s activities concern bird watching.  All activities remain at a level of 
self-recognition and self-entertainment; few are reported to the public.  Few efforts 
were made by Case A2 to foster public environmental consciousness. 
Additional evidence for Case A1 possessing greater efficacy than A2 lies in the 
organization’s ability to influence the government and enterprise.  In 2003, Case A1 
put forward one to two proposals to the government and three to five proposals to 
enterprises.  Although they cannot tell whether the government accepted their 
proposals63, the talks they held with a few entrepreneurs, e.g. Beijing Shunyin 
Niulanshan Liquor Farm, turned out to be very fruitful, and most entrepreneurs 
showed willingness to consider the group’s proposals.  In contrast, Case A2 did not 
submit any proposals to either the government or the enterprises in 2003. 
Finally, Case A1 obtained two awards for its activities, one from the China 
University of Mining and Technology and the other from Roots and Shoots – the Jane 
Goodall Institute64.  In addition, the group’s fieldwork report from the water quality 
investigation along the Huai River was recommended to the Party’s Beijing Municipal 
                                                        
62 This judgment is derived from media reports. 
63 This is because not all proposals are accepted in an obvious way – the government responds verbally and 
follows the advices in action.  In many cases, the government does not respond. Yet changes according to the 
proposed advices would still be seen. 
64 The Jane Goodall Institute is an international non-profit environmental organization founded by Dr. Jane 
Goodall. 
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Publicity Bureau and awarded the “Excellent Fieldwork Report.”  In contrast, Case 
A2 received no awards. 
Therefore Case A1 does have a higher efficacy than Case A2.  This can partially 
be explained by A1 having a greater funding dependency on the superintendent 
department.  The critical junction in the correlation of an NGO’s funding 
dependency and efficacy lies in the questions of why a superintendent unit funds an 
NGO and how an NGO spends the money.  Two fundamental reasons motivate a 
superintendent unit to fund a small-scale NGO: utility considerations and nonmaterial 
considerations.  A superintendent unit can fund an NGO with the plan of assigning 
tasks to it.  In this sense, the government funds an NGOs as a “tool.”  In other cases, 
the government funds an NGO for other nonmaterial uses, such as to promote an 
image of the government as a “commonweal sponsor.”  However, neither of these 
concern pivotal political interests, due to the relative political irrelevance of 
small-scale NGOs and the limited amount of funding they require.  Thus, none of the 
funding to small-scale NGOs requires trading for crucial political compromises, 
which would otherwise constrain an NGO’s functions and thereby affect its efficacy. 
Take Case A1 for example: its superintendent department provides funding for 
two primary reasons: the superintendent department can assign research jobs to Case 
A1 and the superintendent department can use Case A1 to earn honors and enrich the 
campus life.65  Neither of these purposes involves compromising either Case A1’s 
essential independence or any political interests.  Although operational autonomy of 
                                                        
65 From an interview with Mr. Li Penghui, the student leader of “the Lvyuan Roots and Shoots” at China 
University of Mining and Technology on 1st November, 2004.  Please interested parties contact the author if 
copies of the interview records are needed. 
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Case A1, as mentioned by the student leader, is affected by the superintendent unit to 
some degree66, the impact is limited and no evidence shows that it relates to the 
funding relationship.67  Hence, funding dependency in this circumstance is actually a 
benefit for Case A1’s development rather than a constraint. 
In contrast, the moderate actions of Case A2 are rooted in its financial system.  
Without any external funding, the survival and maintenance of the organization 
depends wholly on its members.  Thus, members take the liberty to engage in leisure 
events that most interest them, for example bird watching, rather than undergo 
activities that require labor and intensive planning, such as developing bird-related 
public environmental education programs.   
A second reason can be attributed to the political irrelevance of small-scale NGOs.  
If environmental NGOs enjoy a large degree of freedom because of their political 
irrelevance, then small-scale environmental NGOs enjoy even more freedom because 
of their small size and limited scope.  As a result, the government would not bother 
to impose political controls on small-scale NGOs though directed funding.  
Therefore funding independency has endowed Case A2 with no more freedom than 
Case A1.  Instead, the funding independency deteriorates Case A2’s funding 
insufficiency, which radically undermines Case A2 efficacy. 
 
Comparison Group B 
Group B comprises three larger-scale NGOs: the “Friends of Nature” (Case B1), 
                                                        
66 I will look into this further in the session of “operational autonomy.” 
67 Actually challenges on case a1’s operational autonomy relates to its organizational dependency, which I will 
talk further in the next session. 
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the China Environmental Culture Promotion Association (Case B2), and the Chinese 
Society of Soil and Water Conservation (Case B3).  They are all formally registered 
NGOs located in Beijing with geographic function areas beyond the national borders 
and yearly expenditure scales over RMB ￥500, 000.  Case B1 is not dependent at 
all on government funding; Case B2 drew around 30% of its funding from its 
government superintendent department in 2003; and, Case B3 receives 50% of its 
funding from its government superintendent department. 
Evidence shows that Case B1, the NGO with the lowest funding dependency on 
the government, has the highest efficacy in group B.  Case B3, with the highest 
funding dependency on the government, has the lowest efficacy.  Therefore, for 
large-scale NGOs, funding dependency has a negative correlation with efficacy.  
In other words, the more financially dependent an NGO is on the government, 
the lower its efficacy.  Since cases under discussion are of larger scales, the 
difference in the degrees of dependency is not negligible, and therefore cannot be 
ignored.  In addition to comparing NGOs without any government funding with 
those that depend in some way on the government, I also compare NGOs that have 
different degrees of funding dependency.  I evaluate each case’s efficacy by how 
well respective goals are achieved, as well as strength in influencing government and 
enterprise. 
All three cases aim to promote environmental consciousness of the public and 
sustainable development of the country.  Case B1 states its objective as “promote[ing] 
environmental protection and sustainable development in China by raising 
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environmental awareness and initiating a ‘green culture’ among the public.”68  In 
pursuing its objective, Case B1 engages in mass education for environmental 
protection in various ways, conducts field research and information collection, 
provides opportunities for communication and learning among members, and 
participates in miscellaneous international activities and transnational cooperation on 
environmental protection.69 
Since 1999, Case B1 has launched the “Environmental Education Van Program” 
as well as “The Green Hope Initiative” to further environmental awareness among 
secondary school students in rural areas.  According to the group’s website: “Since 
taking to the road, our ‘green van’ has been teaching children in cities and villages 
across China to listen to nature, to revere all life and understand the laws of 
ecology.”70   Within only a few years, Case B1 has set up a full-fledged itinerant 
environmental education network in rural China.  “The Better Environment 
Scheme,” aims to encourage primary and middle school students to design and 
implement environmental protection schemes in their own communities.  Totally 100 
project designs were collected in Beijing during the past 2000-2001 program.  These 
designs concern animal rescue, recycling, tree planting, garbage classification, water 
pollution and wastewater treating, disposable utensils, etc.  Winners received 
sponsorship to carry out their projects.  Other Case B1 programs include “Help to 
Save the Tibetan Antelope,” bird watching and tree planting. 
                                                        
68 See http://www.fon.org.cn/index.php?id=257, available on 4th May, 2005. 
69 See the Charter of Friends’ of Nature in Chinese at http://www.fon.org.cn/FONWorld/Chapter/page1.htm, 
available on 4th May, 2005. 
70 http://www.fon.org.cn/index.php?id=252, available on 4th May, 2005. 
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Besides these programs conducted on a regular base, Case B1 has held many 
other activities such as an investigation on Bai River, training opportunities for rural 
teachers, and small funding gifts provided to student organizations.  Most of these 
programs and activities received media attention and public approval.71  Furthermore, 
in 2003 Case B1 forwarded to the government more than ten proposals, around 7 were 
responded to and around 3 to 4 were accepted.  The two most recent proposals are 
one which objects to a government project of building dams on the Nu River and one 
against building filterproof films at the Summer Palace.  The appeal against building 
dams on the Nu River by Case B1 and many other NGOs won dialogue opportunities 
with the local government and forced the central government to finally suspend the 
project.  The petition to stop the ongoing project building filterproof films at 
Summer Palace urged the government to see the negative impacts of this project on 
nature.  Today, the two issues remain hotly contested.  In 2003, Case B1 forwarded 
six to nine proposals to enterprises, most of which were effective.72 
Comparatively, Case B2 has a more restrained, but high level of efficacy.  
Holding similar objectives as Case B1, Case B2 strives to promote environmental 
consciousness of the public and sustainable development of the country, particularly 
emphasizing “environmental culture.”  Environmental culture refers to “all cultural 
activities that are committed to harmonizing relations between man and nature, and 
between man and man for any sustainable development.”73  As prescribed in its 
                                                        
71 See a list of reports at http://www.fon.org.cn/index.php?id=251, available on 4th May, 2005. 
72 Details are not elaborated here due to the limited length of the thesis.  Interested parties please contact the 
author for interview records, or go to the Nature’s Friend’s official website http://www.fon.org.cn/.  
73 Pan Yue, Deputy Director of State Environmental Protection Administration, “The Environmental Culture and 
National Renaissance,” a speech delivered at the first Green China Form on October 25, 2003, p. 1. 
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constitution 74 , Case B2 bridges and links the State Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA, Case B2’s government superintendent department) with 
well-known writers and artists.  Through the great social influence of literature and 
art, it works to promote mass environmental education and raise public environmental 
awareness.  Case B2 holds various activities for its superintendent department, SEPA.  
It also works to rally, influence and mobilize other environmental NGOs as directed 
by SEPA.  Furthermore, Case B2 works on enhancing international communication 
and cooperation on environmental protection with international environmental NGOs. 
There is a long list of activities that Case B2 held in 2003, such as the first 
“Green China Forum,” “Green China Night” performance, and the nomination of 
“Chinese Environmental Ambassadors,” etc.  The media attended and reported all of 
Case B2’s events.  Due to the “tool” role of Case B2 for its government 
superintendent department, it never opposes the government or makes any 
inflammatory remarks.  For sensitive issues, such as the Nu River issue championed 
by Case B1, Case B2 avoids any confrontation with its “boss.”  The content of the 
above events were thus tailored for the government’s taste.  Although in the field of 
environment protection, few differences exist between the interests of government 
authorities and those of NGOs, several differences do occur, and in these cases, it is 
necessary for an NGO to be able to challenge the government’s position.  Case B2 
lacks this ability to confront the government when such contentious issues arise.  
Case B2 has not brought forward any proposals to either the government or enterprise, 
                                                        
74 China Environment Culture Promotion Association, the File Assembly from the 2nd Members’ Representative 
Congress. 
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let alone confrontational ones like those submitted by Case B1. 
Case B3 has the lowest efficacy level in Group B.  Case B3 is a soil and water 
conservation academic and science association.  Founded in 1985, Case B2 has 13 
provincial and regional branches and 9000 members, 9 units of group members and 3 
foreign honorary members.  However in 2003, Case B3 held only several small-scale 
academic activities and none were reported by the media.  One activity concerns a 
conference on the local soil and water protection network construction.  But it was 
limited within very small participation and not reported to the public.  Additionally, 
it did not advance any proposal to either the government or enterprise during that 
year.  
Seeing from Case B1, B2 and B3’s introduction on how much they have done to 
achieve the goal of environment protection and their influences to the government and 
the enterprises, I conclude that efficacy decreases from Case B1 to B3.  Recalling the 
level of NGO dependency on government funding, conversely, dependency increases 
from Case B1 to B3, respectively as 0%, 30% and 50%.  Therefore, I conclude that, 
for large-scale NGOs, funding dependency has a negative correlation with efficacy.  
In other words, the greater an NGO’s financial dependency on the government, the 
poorer their performances.  The fundamental reason for this trend can be answered 
following an analysis of the reasons that a superintendent unit funds an NGO and how 
the NGO spends the money.  International relations between NGOs serve as an 
additional explanation. 
Providing funds to large-scale NGOs is a strategic maneuver by the government.  
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Since the great amount of funding needed for large-scale NGOs, a greater purpose lies 
behind the government funding.  Similar to that of small-scale NGOs, the 
superintendent government department provides funding for two main purposes: 
assigning concrete tasks and non-material uses.  Yet, the latter one has essentially 
different implications for large-scale NGOs than small-scale NGOs.  In this sense, 
the government unit not only controls the organizational framework and human 
resources of an NGO, but also accesses, through this “link” within the NGO, other 
non-governmental powers and thereby imposes its influence on NGO activities.  
This sort of government interference constrains an NGO’s performance: the more 
dependent an NGO is, the more restrained it is; the more restrained it is, the poorer its 
performance.  Case B2 is restrained in this way.  Case B3, with its office located on 
Beijing Forestry University’s campus, co-superintendent by the Ministry of Water 
Resources, the Ministry of Forestry and the Ministry of Agriculture and directed by 
the China Association for Science and Technology, is even more restrained because of 
the number of superintendent departments to which it must respond. 
A second explanation for the negative correlation between funding dependency 
and efficacy for large-scale NGOs is international relations.  Without government 
funding, NGOs must seek their funds from other sources; many turn to international 
NGOs for assistance.  An NGO with government funding has less motivation to 
interact with international organizations, as they have a stable source of funds.  In 
addition to funds, international organizations can support NGOs with experts, 
technologies, experiences and networks.  All of these contribute to a higher efficacy.  
 81
As I discovered from my questionnaire, Case B3 does not interact with any 
international organizations; Case B2 interacts with more than ten international 
organizations; and, Case B3 interacts with more than ten international organizations 
as well.  Yet, Case B3 has more in-depth international relations than Case B2 
because it not only interacts with these organizations, it actually draws most of its 
funds from these organizations.  This further verifies the logic increased government 
funding results in fewer relationships with international NGOs, and fewer 
international relationships lead to lower efficacies. 
Back to Quantitative – Two Groups: Smaller and Larger 
 The contradiction between the conclusions from the quantitative and qualitative 
measures may seem confusing.  But, upon closer examination, the divergence 
between small-scale NGOs and large-scale NGOs may be causing the 
inconclusiveness of the quantitative measure.  Based on additional quantitative 
analysis, outlined below, separate analyses for small-scale NGOs and large-scale 
NGOs actually support and compliment the previous qualitative study. 
 In the following quantitative analysis, cases are divided into two groups 
according to their yearly expenditure scales.  Cases with yearly expenditures less 
than RMB ￥10,000 are labeled small-scale NGOs; cases with yearly expenditures 
greater than ￥10,000 are classified as large-scale NGOs.  Correlations between 
funding dependency and NGO efficacy are tested within each group. 
 For small-scale NGOs, since their required funding is small, I distinguish only 
between those with government funding and those without.  Table 4.3 shows that 
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small-scale NGOs with no government funding (marked by “0”) have comparatively 
lower efficacies; those that enjoy government funding (marked by “1”) have relatively 
higher efficacies.  This indicates that when not differentiating the degrees of funding 
dependency, government funding dependency contributes to higher efficacy, which 





0 1 2 10 
Funding Dependency 0 4 2  6
1 3 1 4
Total 4 2 3 1 10
  
Table 4.3: Crosstabulation between the funding dependency and efficacy for small-scale NGOs 
 
As large-scale NGOs require greater amounts of funding, I have to distinguish 
between different degrees of funding dependency.  As Table 4.4 shows, except for a 
few numbers that distribute at the upper left corner, all other numbers are distributed 
along the line from the lower left corner to the upper right corner.    This indicates 
that, allowing a few exceptions, most cases with higher funding dependency have 
lower efficacies.  According to Table 4.5, the correlation is significant.  This again 
confirms the conclusion drawn from the previous qualitative study -- funding 
dependency works negatively on NGO efficacy. 








 0 2 10 12 
Funding 
Dependency
.00 4 1 1 6
.30  
.50 1  1
.72  
.80 1  1
.95 1  1
1.00 1  1
Total  6 1 2 1 10
  
 
Table 4.4: Crosstabulation between the funding dependency and efficacy for large-scale NGOs 
 
Funding Dependency NGO Efficacy 
Funding Dependency Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.677
Sig. (2-tailed) . .001
N 10 10
NGO Efficacy Pearson Correlation -.677 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .
N 10 10
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 4.5: Significance of the correlation between the funding dependency and efficacy for large-scale 
NGOs 
 
2) Organizational dependency 
Quantitative – General 
 As shown Table 4.6, the numbers in the crosstabulation between the 
organizational dependency and efficacy do not show any tendency for significant 
correlations; the significance of the correlation appears low as well.  [See Table 4.7] 





0 1 2 3
NGO 
Efficacy 
0 4 4 1 1 10
1 1 1 2
2 1 2 1 4
3 1 1
10 1 1 2
12 1 1
Total 7 9 2 2 20
 







Pearson Correlation 1.000 .137
Sig. (2-tailed) . .565
N 20 20
NGO Efficacy Pearson Correlation .137 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .565 .
N 20 20
 
Table 4.7: Significance of the correlation between the organizational dependency and efficacy 
 
Qualitative 
Organizational dependency displays in three different forms: copying the 
government superintendent department for framework and setup; being interfered by 
the state in constitution-making process; and being told what to include in the content 
of the constitution. 
I argue that an NGO’s organizational dependency on the government works 
negatively on its efficacy.  Hence, with all other things being equal, the more 
dependent an NGO is in organizational framework on the government, the 
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poorer its performance.  I will analyze the cases used in Group B. 
 During the first years of its existence, Case B1’s institutional framework was 
loose and flexible.  After years of exploration, a formal written institutional 
framework was setup and prescribed, with no interference by the government.75  
Case B1 designed its own institutional framework according to its needs, modeling 
some aspects on international NGOs.  Its constitution was completely self-drafted, 
without any government interference.  The constitution prescribes that Case B1 was 
formally registered in March 1994 as the Academy for Green Culture, an affiliate to 
the Academy for Chinese Culture.  Yet the registration management agency, the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs, does not interfere with Case B1’s internal affairs; neither 
does the leading professional unit, the Academy for Chinese Culture. 
 Compared to Case B1, Case B2 is much more dependent on its government 
superintendent department for its organizational framework.  Case B2 used to be 
under the supervision of the China Environment News, a State Environmental 
Protection Administration (SEPA)-affiliated unit.  In 2003, SEPA took over Case B2 
for direct supervision.  Case B2’s institutional framework is not as complicated as 
that of SEPA, yet its constitution had to be ratified by SEPA.  Plus, when it took-over 
Case B2, SEPA issued several government orders that appended Case B2’s original 
constitution with explicit political control.  The government order, which announced 
SEPA’s take-over of Case B2 for direct supervision, also stipulated the new functions 
of Case B2, which stated “to do something as SEPA prescribed.”76 
                                                        
75 http://www.fon.org.cn/index.php?id=2786, available on 5th May, 2005. 
76  See File No. 72 in 2003 by the State Environmental Protection Administration of China, “A Few 
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 Case B3 is even more dependent on its superintendent government departments.  
The situation of Case B3 is complicated because it not only has a “registration 
management agency,” the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and three “professional leading 
units,” the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Forestry and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, but it is also part of the China Association for Science and Technology 
and is affiliated with the Beijing Forestry University.  Case B3 responds to a 
different “boss” on different occasions.  In terms of organizational framework, Case 
B3 set up its institution framework by copying from the China Association for 
Science and Technology.  Its constitution was based on “The Sample Constitution for 
China Association for Science and Technology Affiliated National Associations”77 
and ratified by the Beijing Forestry University together with Case B3’s annual 
membership congress.  Although political control is not explicitly expressed in its 
constitution, the deputy secretary of Case B3, Ms. Huang Yuan, revealed to the author 
several administrative rules regulating Case B3’s responses to various political 
“bosses” regarding various affairs.78 
 Therefore, for Case B1, Case B2 and Case B3, the higher the organizational 
dependency on the government, the lower the efficacy.  An NGO’s organizational 
dependency on the government, in all its three forms, works negatively on its efficacy.  
The institutional framework copying brews bureaucracy and breeds ill-suited 
                                                                                                                                                               
Announcements on the Supervision Adjustment of the China Environmental Culture Promotion Association,” 4 
August, 2003. 
77 The Chinese Society of Soil and Water Conservation, “The Chinese Society of Soil and Water Conservation 
Constitution,” passed on 25 May, 1992, partly edited on the 2nd Chinese Society of Soil and Water Conservation 
National Congress, p. 7. 
78 From an interview with Ms. Huang Yuan, the chairwoman of The Chinese Society of Soil and Water 
Conservation on 10th October, 2004.  Please interested parties contact the author if copies of the interview records 
are needed. 
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frameworks, both of which lead to manpower waste and inefficiency.  As my survey 
results suggest, both the average working hours and working intensity decline from 
Case B1 to B3.  Interviews also show that there is room for Case B2 and B3 to cut 
down its superfluous personnel and sections but “we (they) just do not feel the need to 
do so since the original organizational framework just prescribes so.”79 
Moreover, the lack of autonomy in constitution-making results in ambiguity in an 
NGO’s goals and decreased motivation to achieve these goals.  Interview records 
show that Case B3 and many other NGOs’ constitutions simply follow a mold 
constitution prescribed by the government superintendent unit for all the NGOs under 
its supervision.  “All the NGOs just put their own names and limited special points 
into the blueprint.”80  This way of constitution-making results in the ambiguity of the 
NGO’s objectives and less motivated staffs, which could fundamentally impair an 
NGO’s efficacy. 
Back to Quantitative – Why Failed? 
 One explanation for the quantitative measure failing to support the qualitative one 
is the uneven distribution of the values of organizational dependency.  From the 
crosstabulation (Table 4.6), there are as many as sixteen cases with low organizational 
dependency (0 or 1), but only four cases with high organizational dependency (2 or 3).  
The small number of cases with high organizational dependency does not permit the 
extrapolation in a systematic quantitative analysis. 
 Another possible reason is that the quantitative measures for the organizational 




dependency only take up two out of the four possible measures, as shown in Table 3.1.  
The other two, the organizational framework set-up and constitution-prescribed NGO 
affiliation to the state, are all qualitative.  Because these two measurements concern 
quite an amount of detailed descriptions, it is very difficult to quantify them.  
Quantifying them would cause a great amount of data waste.  Therefore, the two 
quantitative measures out of the four measures in all might not be ample to stand for 
the whole concept of the organizational dependency.  Measuring the organizational 
dependency only quantitatively would cause biased measurement, which may further 
result in the inconclusiveness of the quantitative measurement. 
3) Human Resources Dependency 
Quantitative – General 
The crosstabulation between the human resources dependency and efficacy does 
not show a tendency for significant correlations; the significance of the correlation 
appears low as well.  [See Table 4.8 and 4.9].  The quantitative analysis comes out 
as inconclusive.  Based on the lack of a significant correlation, one might believe no 
relationship exists between human resources dependency and NGO efficacy.  






0 1 2 3 4
NGO 
Efficacy 
0 7 1 1 1 10
1 2 2
2 1 1 1 1 4
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3 1 1
10 1 1 2
12 1 1
Total 13 1 3 2 1 20
 
Table 4.8: Crosstabulation between the human resources dependency and efficacy 
 
NGO Efficacy Human Resource 
Dependency 
NGO Efficacy Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.003




Pearson Correlation -.003 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .991 .
N 20 20
 
Table 4.9: Significance of the correlation between the human resources dependency and efficacy 
 
Qualitative 
Originally top-down NGOs and originally bottom-up NGOs have a very clear 
divergence on the issue of human resources dependency, although this might not be 
the case for other types of dependency.  Therefore, I will analyze each situation 
separately.  I will determine that for originally top-down NGOs, dependency on 
the government for human resources generally works positively on its efficacy.  
For originally bottom-up NGOs, which have comparatively less of a human 
resources dependency on the government, keeping the status quo while 
expanding the personal network, especially with the government, helps to 
increase their efficacies. 
For originally top-down NGOs, there are essentially three forms of human 
resources dependency, as shown in Table 4.10.  The first is the organization’s head or 
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cadres’ personal network with the government, which develops through work with the 
government, either in the past or concurrently.  The second is NGO dependency on 
the government for recruitment of a new head or new cadres.  The third is NGO 
dependency on the government if its personnel’s welfare and compensation are 
included in the government’s budget. 
 
z Personal Network    Head       Prior Experience     In the Gov. 
                       Cadres       Concurrent Post 
 
z Human Patronage   Recruitment -- State interference in the generation of 
                                 head and cadres 
 
Welfare – Whether belong to the civil servants 
welfare and compensation system. 
  
Table 4.10: Forms of human resources dependency 
 
I will take the two originally top-down NGOs in group B, Case B2 and Case B3, 
for comparison.  Generally speaking, Case B2 has a much higher human resources 
dependency on the government than Case B3. 
 The chairman of Case B2, Mr. Pan Yue, is also the incumbent deputy director of 
SEPA, the government superintendent department of Case B2.  Prior to working at 
Base B2, Mr. Pan had over 10 years’ work experience in various departments of the 
government.  Among Case B2’s 188 council members in the standing committee, 
twelve hold concurrent positions in various sections in SEPA, and an additional 
thirteen hold positions in nine other government departments, including the Ministry 
of Finance, Ministry of Water Resources, Ministry of Culture, and the State 
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Administration of Taxation.81  Mr. Pan, was appointed by SEPA, the superintendent 
government department.  The eleven vice chairmen, one secretary-general, and two 
deputy secretaries-general in the standing council were nominated by the chairman 
and ratified by the superintendent government unit.  A quota of nine staff in Case B2 
is affiliated to the government civil servants welfare and compensation system.82  
95% of staff in Case B2 enjoys sufficient payments83, according to my questionnaire. 
The standing committee of Case B3 consists of nineteen representatives, of which 
there are one chairman, five vice chairmen, one secretary-general and four deputy 
secretaries-general.  The routine work is conducted by an office with four full-time 
and two part-time staff.  The chairman, Ms. Huang Yuan, previously worked in the 
Beijing Foreign University, but never in the government, and holds no concurrent 
position.  Most office staff had previous work experience in universities, rather than 
the government.  It is prescribed in the constitution that the chairman should be 
nominated by the ex-chairman and ratified by the superintendent departments.  The 
cadres should be nominated by the elected chairman and ratified by the superintendent 
departments as well.  The staffs of Case B3 are affiliated with the Beijing Forestry 
University.  67% of the staff are sufficiently paid, according to my survey. 
To sum up, although Case B3 has a human resources dependency on the 
government, Case B2’s human resources dependency on the government is much 
higher.  As we have already compared in the first section, Case B2 has a much 
                                                        
81 http://www.tt65.net/member.php#xitong, available on 9th May, 2005. 
82  See File No. 72 in 2003 by the State Environmental Protection Administration of China, “A Few 
Announcements on the Supervision Adjustment of the China Environmental Culture Promotion Association,” 4 
August, 2003. 
83 See previous chapter for definition of “sufficient payments.” 
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higher efficacy than Case B3.  Hence, an originally top-down NGO’s human 
resources dependency on the government correlates positively with its efficacy.  
Therefore, for originally top-down NGOs, dependency on the government for 
human resources generally works positively on its efficacy. 
This can be explained because most forms of human resources dependency on the 
government increase NGO efficacy.  First of all, an organization’s personal network 
with the government enhances the government’s understanding of and cooperation 
with an NGO’s work.  In a relational society like China, a personal network with the 
state, as a great resource, can determine the success or failure of any social entity.  
Personal networks can sometimes work magically and tackle problems that can not be 
tackled through formal procedures.  Wide-ranging personal networks with the 
government not only help an NGO with its registration (to find a professional leading 
unit), but also with its operation, such as information sharing. 
Secondly, NGO dependency on the government for recruitment has both benefits 
and costs, but the benefits outweigh the costs.  The government’s patronage on an 
NGO’s recruitment indicates that almost all the persons appointed or ratified have a 
close involvement in both the superintendent government department and the 
superintended NGO.  Thus, this double-posting of personnel could be used as tools 
for the government to extend its controls over NGOs; however this type of control is 
very limited because the double-posted personnel, in their own interests, are supposed 
to balance the interests of the government and NGO, and thus cannot simply impose 
state interests on the NGOs.  Instead, these persons would function as an 
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intermediary between the two, which brings actual benefits to the superintended NGO.  
With this “affinity” on a personal level, NGOs enjoy easier access to the government 
for its beneficial supports, e.g. staff training and publicity.  NGOs can also exert 
more impacts on the government owning to this “affinity.”  These benefits far more 
outweigh the political controls imposed by the recruitment patronage.   
Thirdly, NGOs need talent for survival and development.  Government budgeted 
personnel in an NGO, although implicating political control, largely ensures personnel 
welfare sufficiency, which further ensures the organization’s ability for attracting 
talents.  In this way, NGO’s personnel welfare dependency on the state enhances 
NGO efficacy as well. 
Originally bottom-up NGOs only bear the first of the above forms of human 
resources dependency: personal network with the government.  They do not depend 
on the government for staff recruitment or personnel welfare.  Due to the limited 
number of observations, it is difficult to find cases among bottom-up NGOs with 
different personal network capabilities with the government while, at the same time, 
possessing the same leveled geographic scopes and expenditure scales.  Despite this, 
successful cases exist, such as the Friends of Nature and the Global Village of Beijing, 
which both have more networks with the government than the other NGOs. 
The founder and incumbent president of Friends of Nature, Liang Congjie, was 
born into a well-known family in China.  In the late 19th century, Liang's grandfather, 
Liang Qichao, was a Western-influenced reformer who served in the Qing dynasty 
court.  He was a leader of the ill-fated 1898 Reform Movement, which aimed to 
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introduce Western political reforms in an attempt to save the corrupt and ailing 
imperial system.  Liang’s father, Liang SiCheng, was a renowned architect who 
served as a Beijing city planner after the Communist victory in 1949.  Liang Congjie 
himself is a commissioner of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
and a history professor at Peking University.  No doubt, his background and current 
position enables him easier access to networks both in politics and academics.  He 
“urged that NGOs seeking to effect change must find ways to cooperate with the 
government (both nationally and locally) rather than opposing it.”84  As for the 
Global Village of Beijing, Sheri Liao, the founder and president, has been invited for 
panel discussions with many Chinese political leaders because of her tremendous 
contributions and pioneer efforts in the field of environmental protection.  Therefore, 
it is either the case that more advanced personal networks with the government lead to 
better performances or that better performances attract a better/more 
in-depth/increased personal networks with the government.  In conclusion, for 
bottom-up NGOs, human resources dependency on the government has a positive 
correlation with efficacy.  It is advisable for an NGO to keep current independence 
on human resources while at the same time expanding the personal network with the 
government. 
Back to Quantitative 
The divergence between top-down NGOs and bottom-up NGOs may cause the 
inconclusiveness of the quantitative measurement and separate analysis for top-down 
                                                        
84 By Gulimian, American-China Academic Communication Committee 1996 summer, “Friends of Nature,” see 
http://www.fon.org.cn/index.php?id=251, available on 9th May, 2005. 
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NGOs and bottom-up NGOs might solve the problem.  But, in all twenty 
observations, only the two cases used for the qualitative comparison fall into the 
category of top-down NGOs, the remaining eighteen NGOs are bottom-up.  The 
insufficient case number does not permit a systematic quantitative analysis.  
Therefore, this part of quantitative support for the qualitative measurement is left for 
future studies, which should include a sufficient number of GONGOs as part of the 
sample. 
4) Operational Dependency 
Generally, the lack of operational autonomy for NGOs leads to poor 
performance.  As is easily inferred, the state’s interference into an NGO’s internal 
decision-making and daily activities disturbs NGO operations.  Lasting interference 
can cause imbalance of the operational system and loss of initiatives, both of which 
are fatal for an NGO.  As for operational network dependency, I should give notice 
to the direct convenience resulting from an NGO’s activities, for example the success 
of the “Project Hope” by the China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF) reviewed 
in Chapter two.  Yet the result left behind deep in the organization from the 
operational network dependency, such as low efficiency, bureaucracy even corruption, 
should not be neglected either.   As evidence shows, the resplendency of “Project 
Hope” does not overshadow the corruption scandal of CYDF uncovered in later 
years.85 
Using the measures settled in Chapter three for measuring the operational 
                                                        
85 The corruption scandal of CYDF was largely disputed within the country from 1994 when it was first disclosed 
by a Hong Kong newspaper “Next Magazine.” 
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dependency, comparison group C provides further proof for this conclusion. 
Comparison Group C 
 Group C includes two cases, Beijing Brooks Education Center (Case C1) and the 
Chinese Society of Soil and Water Conservation (Case C2, also as Case B3).  Both 
cases are environmental NGOs with main offices located in Beijing, geographic 
functional scopes within Mainland China, and yearly expenditure scales above RMB 
￥100,000.  The difference between the two is that Case C1 is a taxed NGO 
registered at the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, while Case C2 is a formally 
registered NGO registered at the Ministry of Civil Affairs.  This difference hatches 
the major distinction between the two in their operational autonomies. 
 Case C1 has a much higher operational autonomy than Case C2.  Because Case 
C1 is registered as an enterprise and must pay taxes, the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce supervises Case C1 in the same way it supervises all the other enterprises.  
This type of supervision does not imply any interference with Case C1’s internal 
affairs, especially in the aspect of operations.  No other entity has the right to 
supervise Case C1, either.  Therefore, Case C1 enjoys complete operational 
independency.  Case C2 faces a different situation.  As I mentioned in previous 
analysis, Case C2 has various superintendent government departments to respond to 
on different occasions.  Each department has a say in Case C2’s internal 
decision-making whenever the department’s interests are at stake.  Case C2 also has 
to apply for approval from and submit activity reports to the superintendent 
departments before and after an activity is to be held.  Case C2 has a considerable 
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degree of network dependency in its operations.  For instance, it frequently turns to 
its superintendent departments’ networks for inviting participants to conferences.86 
 As it turns out, Case C1 has a much higher efficacy than does Case C2.  
Established in June 2003, Case C1 has held more than six activities in less than six 
months.87  It aims “to promote the development of a civil society through education 
programs,” and “to raise active citizens with an understanding of sustainable 
development and a sense of responsibility,” primarily through environmental 
education and rural education.88  Its “Forum for All” project has held several forums 
covering a wide range of topics, with all forums free for attendees.  The forums were 
well-received by the surrounding communities.  Other programs include “The 
Wetland Reserve Program,” which promotes environmental education for rural 
children and teachers in China’s five wetland conservation areas, and “The Winter 
Camp for Disadvantaged Undergraduates” co-launched with the Ford Foundation.  
Although Case C1 has never had its activities broadcasted by the media and has never 
submitted proposals to government or enterprise, the activities of Case C1 had a much 
greater influences than those of Case C2, seen from either the frequency of activities 
or the scope of targeted people.  Therefore, with everything else being equal, Case 
C2 has a higher operational dependency, but a lower efficacy than Case C1.  I 
conclude that the lack of operational autonomy for NGOs leads to poor 
performances, and vice versa. 
                                                        
86 From an interview with Ms. Huang Yuan, the chairwoman of The Chinese Society of Soil and Water 
Conservation on 10th October, 2004.  Please interested parties contact the author if copies of the interview records 
are needed. 
87 Data from survey. 
88 http://www.brooks.ngo.cn/English/English_index.htm, available on 10th May, 2005. 
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5) Publicity Dependency 
Publicity dependency of an NGO on the government increases its efficacy.  I 
will use measurements for the publicity dependency (described in Chapter three) to 
measure Case B2 and Case B3 to prove my argument and explain the reasons behind 
it. 
Case B2 is vastly dependent on the government for publicity.  First of all, its 
chairman, Mr. Pan Yue, is a well-known political figure.  Secondly, many celebrated 
political figures attend its activities.  For instance, the director of the State 
Environmental Protection Administration, Mr. Xie Zhenhua, as well as the 
vice-president of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Mr. Bai 
Lichen, attended Case B2’s second membership congress.  Thirdly, its activities are 
broadly reported by the government-controlled media, such as CCTV, Beijing 
Television, People’s Daily, Guangming Daily, China Youth Daily, and China Radio 
Broadcast. 
Comparatively, Case B3 has considerably moderate takes in publicity.  There are 
very few media reports on the organization.  Only a few activities co-sponsored by 
Case B3 and the China Association for Science and Technology were broadcast very 
briefly on CCTV news or local news broadcasts.  Besides, “the Ninth International 
Symposium on River Sedimentation” held in October 2004 in Yichang, China, was 
reported by the Xinhua News, CCTV, China Daily, and Guangming Daily.  Mr. Yang 
Chenhuai, the former minister of the Ministry of Water Resources, attended the 
symposium.  However, Case B3 was reported only as a co-sponsor among the one 
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organizer, four sponsors and twenty-nine other co-sponsors of the symposium. 
Therefore, although Case B3 holds a publicity dependency on the government, 
the dependency of Case B3 is much higher than that of Case B2.  As we have 
already analyzed, Case B2 has a much higher efficacy than Case B3 does as well.  
Hence, higher publicity dependency on the government contributes to higher efficacy.  
NGOs must depend on the media for social recognition and good reputation, by which, 
in China, where media and government are almost synonymous, this also implies 
dependency on the government for publicity.  Social recognition and reputation helps 
an NGO to gain the mass’ material supports.  Besides, publicity helps mobilize the 
mass’ supportive behaviors to the NGO’s works, which accords with the NGO’s aims 
to raise public environmental concerns.  Both of the above effects contribute to an 
NGO’s efficacy.  As other evidence shows, NGOs put in great efforts to make their 
organizations and activities known to as many people as possible.  It is true that 
NGOs that frequently stand in the limelight are largely the successful ones, and vice 
versa.  In conclusion, all NGOs, no matter how independent they are in other aspects, 
have to depend on the “voice of the Party” to possess greater public influences and 




 This chapter culminates the thesis both quantitatively and qualitatively.  Both 
regressions and case studies were done.  The two complementary approaches 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides a summary, some possible implications of the study and 
suggestions for future studies. 
 
Sum-up 
To sum up, this thesis is a study on the relations between a macro-relational 
variable, state-NGO relations, and a micro-functional variable, NGO’s efficacy.  
How state interventions affect an NGO’s efficacy in China?  There are primarily five 
forms of state interventions and each of them functions in a unique way affecting an 
NGO’s efficacy.  An NGO’s organizational framework dependency and 
operational dependency on the government reduces its efficacy, while publicity 
dependency enhances its efficacy.  Funding dependency reduces an NGO’s 
efficacy when its scale is small and enhances an NGO’s efficacy when its scale is 
large.  For a top-down NGO, human resources dependency generally enhances its 
efficacy.  For a bottom-up NGO which originally have less human resources 
dependency, it is recommended that it expands its personal networks with the 
government while keeps the status quo of the other forms of human resources 
dependency. 
 
Implications of Thesis 
Because the study of this thesis is limited within environmental NGOs in Beijing 
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and Shanghai, the question of to what extent can the conclusions drawn from this 
study be generalized to other fields or to other locations, needs to be discussed. 
NGOs in China engage in diverse fields, such as poverty alleviation, rights of 
minority groups (women and children, minority ethnic groups, disabled people, etc.), 
and community services.  Most professional associations, like the writers’ 
association and many business associations, also belong to the category of NGOs.  
Different types of NGOs allow different degrees of generalization of the conclusions 
obtained from this study. 
For NGOs which mainly deal with politically sensitive issues, I advise not to 
generalize from the conclusions obtained from this study.  Politically sensitive issues 
in China nowadays that some NGOs engage in include human rights, minority group 
rights, democracy and religions.  NGOs that mainly function in these areas, e.g. the 
China Foundation for Human Rights Development, are much restrained in exerting 
their strength as independent entities outside the government; rather, they are often 
tightly controlled by the state.  Because the political sensitiveness violates the basic 
characteristic – political insensitiveness of the studied group – environmental NGOs, 
the thesis basic reasoning, that how NGO dependency on the state correlates with 
NGO efficacy and how the correlations work so in the qualitative part of Chapter four, 
is thus undermined.  Therefore, generalization of the conclusions obtained from this 
study from environmental NGOs to political sensitive NGOs is not encouraged. 
For politically insensitive fields other than environment protection, such as 
community development and business cooperation, I assume that the conclusions 
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obtained from this study can be generalized.  Examples are the China Consumers’ 
Association and the China Family Planning Association.  These two NGOs both face 
the same situations as the environment NGOs do: at least the majority of their 
activities are of no critical state interest.  Therefore, these NGOs could be applied 
with what I concluded from the environment NGOs as well.  But because not all 
NGOs in these fields are ideally distributed evenly with different degrees of 
dependency on the state as the environment NGOs do, which is critical in allowing a 
large-N quantitative study, the prospect of testifying such an assumption remains 
gloomy. 
For NGOs located in less urbanized areas in China, one thing is that since NGOs 
generally are still at their immature developing stage, they are quite concentrated in 
metropolitan areas like Beijing and Shanghai and very few are located in rural areas.  
The other thing is that for NGOs that exist in other big cities in China, e.g. The Green 
Volunteer League of Chongqing, the conclusions obtained from this study can be 
generalized, yet with reservations; for the very few NGOs that exist in rural areas, e.g. 
the Yanbian Green Federation in Northeast China, the conclusions obtained from this 
study cannot be generalized.  We should take notice of the fact that the more remote 
an NGO is located, the less interested is the state in taking control of it.  The state, 
making full use of its limited attention, focuses on NGOs only related to its critical 
interests.  Thus, location significance, as one form of critical interests, determines 
the extent of state penetrations.  The difference between locations interferes with 
state-NGO relations, which changes the reasoning ground for the correlations between 
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state-NGO relations and NGO efficacy.  Other big cities still enjoy the location 
significance in China somehow but definitely less than that of Beijing and Shanghai.  
Rural areas enjoy the least attention from the state interventions.  Therefore, 
generalizations with reservations are permitted for other big cities, but not for rural 
areas. 
 
Suggested Future Studies 
Two future studies are suggested to complete this study.  One is a supplementary 
public survey on public recognition and reputation of NGOs as an additional measure 
for the dependent variable, NGO’s efficacy, in the aspect of NGOs’ influence towards 
the mass.  The other is a further study on the relations among the five forms of 
NGO’s dependency on the government, to straighten out more clearly of this 
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z Please use a pen in blue or black. 
z For selective questions, please circle the serial number of your choice；For a few 
fill-in-the-blank questions, please fill in appropriate data.  
z For selective questions，if the choices provided do not fit, please choose “other” and specify 
if possible. 
z For some selective questions, there are some choices that have an arrow at the back.  That 
means if you choose that option, you have to continue to the follow-up question as the arrow 
indicates.  
z The questionnaire takes about 15 minutes to finish; Precision would be much appreciated. 
z If you have questions concerning the questionnaire, please do not hesitate to contact me 
(Wang Yaping) at the following number: 13671040555.  
Thank you very much for your patience and support! 
 
Q1[General Information] Please fill in the following table： 
 
Org. Name in Chinese  
Org. Name in English  
Address  Postal Code  
Tel  Fax  






Name of the 
questionnairee 





Q2[Registration] Where was your organization registered?  
1. Ministry of Civil Affairs 2. Ministry of Industry and Commerce   3. School  4. Enterprises 5. Other 
 
Q3[Range] What is the geographical scope in which your organization mainly functions? 
 
1. Within one city, district or county 6. Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan 
2. Within two or more cities, districts or counties 7. Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and mainland 
3. Within one province, autonomous district or municipal 
city 
8. Abroad 
4. Within two or more provinces, autonomous districts or 
municipal cities 
9. Domestic and abroad 
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5. Within China mainland 10. Other (                               )
 
Q4[Field] What are the field(s) that your organization are involved with? (you could have more 
than one option) 
 
1-100 Culture and Arts 4-200 Disaster prevention and save 8-100 Foundations 
1-200 Sports and Recreation 4-300 Poverty alleviation 8-200 Volunteer associations 
2-100 Private schools 5-100 Environmental protection 9-100 International exchange 
2-200 Vocational education 5-200 Animal protection 9-200 International aid 
2-300 Research 6-100 Community development 10-100 Religious group 
3-100 Hospitals, healing centers 6-200 Property management 11-100 Guild, chamber of 
commerce, academy 
3-200 Rest homes 6-300 Employment and 
reemployment services 
12-100 Other 
3-300 Psychological consultation 7-100 Policy consultation  




Q4-1 Choose the ONE field your organization primarily deals with among the above choices, put 
its serial number into the blank below and briefly explain the content of the main activities of the 
organization. 
Serial number：    Activity content：_______________________________ 
 
Q5[Activity] What kind of activities your organization hold? (you could have more than one 
option) 
 
1．Provide funds and materials 9．Enlightening education 
2．Provide services 10．Policy proposals 
3．Non-profit performances and sales 11．Commercial activities 
4．Publicizing 12．Information collection, sort-out and provision 
5．Training 13．Hot-line services 
6．Personal exchange 14．Cultivate grass-roots organizations 
7．Produce publications 15．Other （                            ） 
8．Investigation and research  
 
Q6[Office] Concerning the organization’s office, which of the following descriptions is correct? 
1． In the organization’s leader’s or member’s personal house 
2． Office provided by the superintendent department of the government 
3． Rented office 
4． Owned office 
5． Have no office 
6． Other_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q7[Leadership] Where did the organization’s principal hold a post before he/she came to your 
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organization? 
1. Government  2. Enterprises  3. Other NGOs  4. Other_________________________ 
 
Q8[Leadership] Does the organization’s principal hold a post elsewhere now besides the post he 
hold in your organization? 
1. Yes → Please proceed to Q8-1 
2. No 
 Q8-1 Where else dose the organization’s principal hold a post? 
1. Government  2. Enterprises  3. Other NGOs  4. Other_________________________ 
 
Q9[Leadership] Concerning how the organization’s cadres were produced, which of the following 
descriptions is correct? 
6. The cadres were assigned and designated by the superintendent department of the government 
7. The cadres were nominated by the organization’s principal and ratified by the superintendent department of 
the government 
8. The cadres were elected democratically according to the organization’s constitution 
9. no specific rules 
10. Other_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Q10[Personnel] Your organization has (how many) 
1） ________ staff in all； 
2） Full-time staff________，among which, ________ are paid by your organization; 
3） Part-time staff________，among which, ________ are paid by your organization; 
4） Volunteer________，who work ________ days per month in average; 
Among all the staff，there are ________ people who primarily depend on the income provided by your 
organization （>50% when divided by their overall income compared to their other incomes）.  
 
Q11[Personnel] Your organization has (how many) 
(Sex)  Male________； Female________  
(Age)  Below 30：________ 
   Between 30-49：________ 
   Between 50-59：________ 
   Between 60-69：________ 
(Background) The retired from government________； 
   Those who resigned from government________； 
   Those who are still working in the government________. 
 
Q12[Constitution] Does the organization have a constitution in any form? 
7. Yes → Please continue to Q12-1 
8. No written constitution, yet has an unwritten constitution formed by persistent practice and usage 
9. Other____________________________________________________________ 
 
 Q12-1 Concerning the organization’s constitution, which of the following descriptions is most 
appropriate? 
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1. The constitution was set down by the superintendent department of the government 
2. The constitution was set down by the superintendent department of the government and your organization 
together in cooperation 
3. The constitution was drafted out by your organization and ratified by the superintendent department of the 
government 
4. The constitution was constituted by your organization on your own 
5. Other_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Q13[Decision-making] How does your organization make decisions? 
1. Decisions are made by a formal decision-making machine like a council or assembly → Please continue to 
Q13-1 
2. There is no formal decision-making machine; Decisions are reached in consensus of all member 
3. There is no formal decision-making machine; Decisions are made by more than two cadres after they confer 
with each other  
4. There is no formal decision-making machine; Decisions are made by the principal alone 
5. Other________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Q13-1 There are ________ (how many) people in the decision-making council. 
 
Q14[Membership] Does your organization have members? 
1. Yes → Please continue to Q14-1 and Q14-2 
2. No 
 
 Q14-1 What kind of members do you have? (you could have more than one option) 
1． Activity participants 
2． Clients 
3． Sponsors 
4． Organizations or enterprises sponsored by your organization 
5． Other_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Q14-2 How many members do you have? （till 1st September 2004） 
Individual members ________    Group members ________ 
 
Q15[Expenditure scale] How much is the overall expenditure of your organization for the 
financial year 2003? 
1.                Below ￥1000  6.            ￥100,000-500,000 
2.                ￥1000-5,000  7.            ￥500,000-1000,000 
3.                ￥5,000-10,000 8.            ￥1,000,000-5,000,000 
4.                ￥10,000 -50,000  9.            ￥5,000,000-10,000,000 
5.                ￥50,000 -100,000 10.           Above￥10,000,000 
 
Q16[Income structure] How is the income of your organization for the financial year 2003 
composed? Please fill in each resource’s proportion. 
1. Government subsidy                   % 
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2. Entrepreneurial sponsorship                   % 
3. Social charitable donation                   % 
4. International organization’s sustentation fund                  % 
5. Activity profit from the organization itself                  % 
6. Other (                            )                  % 
Total 100% 
 
Q17[International relations] How many international organizations is your organization keeping 
contact with? 
1. 0  
2. 1~2  
3. 3~5  
4. 6~9  
5. Above 10  
 
Q18[Media relations] has your organization or your activity ever been publicized? 
1． Yes   → Please continue to Q18-1 
2． No 
 
 Q18-1 Please tick on the media who has ever reported your organization or your activity and 







Q19[Social influence] Did your organization ever hold an activity that face the whole society in 
the year 2003? 
1． Yes  → Please continue to Q19-1，Q19-2 and Q19-3 
2． No 
 
 Q19-1 How many such kind of activities did your organization hold in the year 2003? 
1.  1   2.  2~3   3.  4~5   4.  6~10   5. more than 10  
 
 Q19-2 Hereinto, ________ (how many) such kind of activities have been reported by the media. 
 
 Q19-3 The activities’ influence to the society was 
1. tremendous 2. very influential 3. general  4. slight 5. not effective at all  6. Not sure 
 
Q20[Policy proposal to the government] Did your organization bring forward policy proposals to 
the government in the year 2003? 




 Q20-1 How many proposals did your organization bring forward to the government in the year 
2003? 
1.  1~2  2.  3~5  3.  6~9  4.  10~19  5.  More than 20  
  
Q20-2 Hereinto, how many were accepted or practiced? 
1. 0  2. 1  3. 2~5  4. 6~9  5. More than 10  6. Not sure 
 
Q21[Policy proposal to enterprises] Did your organization bring forward policy proposals to any 
enterprise in the year 2003?  
1． Yes  → Please continue to Q21-1 and Q21-2 
2． No 
 
 Q21-1 How many proposals did your organization bringt forward to enterprises in the year 2003? 
1.  1~2  2.  3~5  3.  6~9  4.  10~19  5.  More than 20  
 
  
Q21-2 Hereinto, how many were accepted or practiced? 
1. 0  2. 1  3. 2~5  4. 6~9  5. More than 10  6. Not sure 
 
 
Q22[Government support] According to the organization’s development status quo, do you think 
your organization needs more support or freedom from the government, or both yet support and 
freedom in different fields?  
1． Need more support from the government  → Please continue to Q22-1 
2． Need more freedom from the government  → Please continue to Q22-2 
3． Need both and adjustment of the two in different fields → Please continue to Q22-1 and Q22-2 
4． Need neither of them; the status quo is just ok 
5． Other：__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q22-1 In your opinion, your organization needs more support from the government in which of 
the following aspects? (you could have more than one option) 
1．Financial support 
2．Provide locations for activities 
3．Provide equipments and materials needed for the activities  
4．Provide information on the government’s management rules, related policies and laws  
5．Publicizing and popularizing NGOs and their activities, so as to promote mass acknowledgement and 
participation 
6．Set up information flow systems so that citizens and enterprises could access to NGO’s activities  
7．Set up and better NGO’s evaluation system  
8．Consummate NGO related administerial rules 




22-2 In your opinion, your organization needs more freedom from the government in which of 













































贵组织详细通讯地址  邮政编码  
联系电话  传真  
电子信箱  贵组织成立时间  
贵组织常务负责人  业务主管部门  
填表人（及联系电话）  填表人职务  
 
问 2[注册情况]贵单位是在以下哪个部门登记注册的？请选择回答。 




1. 一个市、区、县范围之内 6. 港、澳、台地区 
2. 两个或两个以上市、区、县 7. 港、澳、台地区与内地 
3. 一个省、自治区、直辖市范围之内 8. 国外 
4. 两个或两个以上省、自治区、直辖市 9. 国内和国外 















1-100文化、艺术 4-100社会服务 7-100政策咨询 
1-200体育、健身、娱乐 4-200防灾、救灾 7-200法律咨询与服务 
2-100民办学校 4-300扶贫 8-100基金会 
2-200职业教育、成人教育  8-200志愿者协会 
2-300调查、研究 5-100环境保护 9-100国际交流 
3-100医院、康复中心 5-200动物保护 9-200国际援助 
3-200养老院 6-100社区发展 10-100宗教团体 
3-300心理咨询 6-200物业管理 11-100行业协会、商会、学会 


























1. 政府  2. 企事业单位  3. 其他民间组织  4. 其他_________________________ 
 
问 8[负责人概况]贵组织常务负责人在担任贵单位负责人的同时是否在其他部门任职？ 
1. 是 →请继续回答问 8-1 
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2. 否 
 问 8-1请问贵组织常务负责人是在以下哪个或哪些部门任职： 
1. 政府  2. 企事业单位  3. 其他民间组织  4. 其他_________________________ 

























   30-49岁：________人 
   50-59岁：________人 
   60-69岁：________人 
职业构成： 政府部门离退休人员________人； 
   从政府部门辞职后加入贵组织的职员________人； 































 问 14-1理事会等正式决策机构的人数为________人。 
 
问 15[会员制度]贵组织是否采取会员制度 
3. 是 →请继续回答问 15-1和 15-2 
4. 否 
 







 问 15-2请在下面空格中填写贵组织的会员数量（截止到 2004年 8月 24日） 
个人会员________人    团体会员________个 
 
问 16[支出规模]关于贵组织 2003年度财务支出总额，请在以下选项中做出选择： 
1.                1000元以下 6.            10万元-50万元 
2.                1000-5000元 7.            50万元-100万元 
3.                5000-10000元 8.            100万元-500万元 
4.                1万元-5万元 9.            500万元-1000万元 










1. 政府补贴 约             % 或 （￥              ）
2. 企业资助 约             % 或 （￥              ）
3. 社会慈善捐款 约             % 或 （￥              ）
4. 国际组织资助 约             % 或 （￥              ）
5. 会员会费 约             % 或 （￥              ）
6. 组织活动赢利 约             % 或 （￥              ）
7. 其他 (                            ) 约             % 或 （￥              ）























3． 是  →请继续回答问 20-1，20-2和 20-3 
4． 否 
 
 问 20-1举办过几次？请选择回答。 
1.  1次  2.  2~3次   3.  4~5次   4.  6~10次  5. 10次以上 
 
 问 20-2其中， _______次活动被媒体报道。 
 
 问 20-3活动的社会反响如何？请选择回答。 
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1． 是  →请继续回答问 21-1和 21-2 
2． 否 
 
 问 21-1提出过几项建议？ 
1.  1~2项  2.  3~5项  3.  6~9项  4.  10~19项  5.  20项以上 
  
问 21-2被政府有关部门采纳的建议有多少？ 
1. 0项  2. 1项  3. 2~5项  4. 6~9项  5. 10项以上  6. 不清楚 
 
问 22[企业政策影响]去年贵组织是否向企业提出过咨询建议？请选择回答。 
1． 是  →请继续回答问 22-1和 22-2 
2． 否 
 
 问 22-1提出过几项建议？ 
1.  1~2项  2.  3~5项  3.  6~9项  4.  10~19项  5.  20项以上 
  
问 22-2被企业有关部门采纳的建议有多少？ 





6． 需要政府的进一步扶持  →请继续回答问 23-1 
7． 需要政府放手、给予组织更大的活动空间  →请继续回答问 23-2 
































































     (86-10)81917655 
Email:        beautychy@163.com 






Address: 北京市海淀区城府路 35 号北陆药业大厦 319 室，
100083 (Beijing, P.R.China) 
Coordinator: Liu,Xinyan 
Tel:  (8610)62631162 
Fax:  (8610)62631162 
Email:     liuxinyan@brooks.ngo.cn 
Website:   http://www.brooks.ngo.cn  
Greener Beijing 绿色北京 Address: 北京市天通苑六区一号楼 1单元 402 室，102209(Beijing, P.R.China)  
Coordinator: Song,Xinzhou 
Tel: 86-10-84820743, 86-13021181610 
E-mail:   info@grchina.net 























Email: wangxiaoshu@gsm.pku.edu.cn  
Tsinghua 
University Green 
清华大学学 Coordinator: Xin,Yan Mobile: (86)13801043612 
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Address: 北京海淀区花园路 3号科委宿舍 245， 
100083(Beijing, P.R.China) 
Coordinator: Zhou,Yu; Tang,Xiyang 
Tel: (8610)63473886  
E-mail：tangxiyang@china.com 
Lvyuan Roots 
and Shoots at 
China University 
























自然之友 Address:北京市东城区骑河楼北巷 10 号共和商务楼 301室，100006 (Beijing, P.R.China) 










Address:北京市宣武区广安门南大街 36 号天缘公寓 A座
1501 室，100054，(Beijing, P.R.China)  










Address: 北京海淀清华东路 35 号北京林业大学 197 信箱，
100083 (Beijing, P.R.China)  
Coordinator: Huang,Yuan 
Tel: (8610) 62338045 62338031  








Address: 上海市共和新路 938 号共和大厦 1801 室，
200070 (Shanghai, P.R.China)  
Coordinator: Wang,Yan 
Tel: (8621) 56633338 












































































Email: realliulin@sohu.com   
 
 
 
